SECULARISM IN MODERN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this thesis is the process of secularization in modern Turkey. It begins with a section reviewing the concept of secularization in sociological l. literature so that the subsequent examination of the Turkish case can be seen in appropriate perspective.

The second section reviews the intellectual arguments current in Turkey at the turn of the century. The three major solutions suggested for the ills of the late Ottoman Empire are rehearsed with specific emphasis on the thought of Ziya Gokalp, by far the most influential of the thinkers at that time. This section ends with a look at the ideas of Ataturk, since his views had the most profound influence on the course of secularization in the Republic.

The third section recounts the practical measures taken towards the goal of secularization. This begins with early military reforms in the Ottoman Empire and is followed by a review of nineteenth century reforms. It ends with a more detailed discussion of reforms implemented in the Ataturk era.

The final section of the study discusses the events from the beginning of the multi-party period until the present time.

The conclusion shows that secularization remains very much a live issue in Turkey today.

NOTE

When mentioning Islamic law in the following study the Turkish term Seriat has been preferred to the transliterated Arabic Sharia.

For the sake of clarity Mustafa Komal is referred to as Ataturk even when discussing the period prior to his receiving this title from the Grand National Assembly.

For similar reasons the city on the Bosphorus is called Istanbul even during the period when it would be more accurate to refer to it as Constantinople.

CONTENTS

SECTION ONE

SECULARIZATION IN SOCIOLOGY

Before turning to the events which have taken place in modern Turkey and to the ideological elements which have brought them into being, we should look briefly at some ideas concerning secularization that are now current in the sociology of religion. This is a contentious area which has produced a great deal of literature. A comprehensive review of all this material is beyond the scope of our enquiry and so we shall confine ourselves to a critical discussion of the term in the hope of arriving at a satisfactory working definition. This will enable us to see the main body of the work against a fairly well defined background.

No attempt will be made here to provide a review of the statistical work which has been carried out into secularization in Western society. This is because we aim in this section to establish a conceptual framework, not an empirical one. In addition, differences between Islamic and Christian societies make statistical comparison of doubtful value, even when adequate statistics are available. Besides, the size of the statistical literature prevents it from being dealt with adequately in the space available.

The term "secularization" as found in sociological literature is not easy to define with any accuracy. This is because its meaning "has become so diffuse as to obscure rather than clarify".[1] In this respect the term is not unique in sociology; such terminological

difficulties are often a barrier to the non-specialist reader approaching sociological literature. Budd gives a telling example of this problem with regard to secularization: "the full churches of the United States, and the empty ones of England, are pointed to as evidence of its existence".[2]

Hewitt refers to secularization as "a situation in which the beliefs and sanctions of religion become - or are in process of becoming - increasingly disregarded in society as guides to conduct or to decision-making".[3] However, this decline in the recognition awarded religion by society is not merely confined to "beliefs and sanctions". This is recognised by Wilson whose definition is both shorter, and more comprehensive than that of Hewitt. For Wilson, secularization is "the process whereby religious thinking, practise and institutions lose social significance".[4] This definition is to be preferred to that of Hewitt. Wilson's definition stresses the loss of social significance. This point deserves amplification.

Secularization is a social process active at the level of the group rather than that of the individual. It is a loss of <u>common</u> belief, of <u>common</u> allegiance to a religion. It is the rejection of an integrated social role for the religious institutions rather than a denial of the existence of the supernatural forces or powers which the religious institutions are held to represent. So we must remember that firm religious commitments on the part of individual Actors does not necessarily disprove the existence of secularization. In examining

secularization it is society as a whole which must be our concern: not merely a particularly conservative or radical individual within society.

Later in this section we shall turn to criticisms of the concept of secularization made by Martin.[5] For the sake of completeness his definition of secularization may be included here. In a fundamental statement of his thesis he declares that "secularization is less a scientific concept than a tool of counter-religious ideologies".[6] We shall return to this view.

Thus, secularization is generally held to be a decline in the social significance of religion. This is seen by a decrease in the relevance of religion to such fields of social life as education, the law, and the political process. As such it is often held to be an age-long process. Throughout history law, science and ethics, amongst other things, have increasingly become matters of personal or collective conscience rather than being based solely on religious precepts. As Pickering puts it: "the process has been at work throughout history: man's history is the history of his secularization".[7]

One further matter demands our attention. It is important to draw one distinction if we are not to be misled by too simplistic an understanding of secularization. This "conceptual distinction...is that between secularization proper, and structural differentiation".[8]

We have noted that shifting the basis for such things as education, law, and so on is a basic indication of secularization. Yet Budd defines "structural

differentiation" as being exemplified by a shift from an education system controlled by the religious institutions to one controlled by the state.[9] Is there, then, a fundamental confusion here? I suggest not. In structural differentiation it is control of the education system which passes out of the religious sphere. But in secularization it is the conceptual base of the educational sphere which passes from religious to secular institutions. Education and educational policies, in secularization, come to be legitimized by reference to predominantly secular, rather than to religious ideologies. This distinguishes secularization proper from structural differentiation. Secularization involves the decline in the acceptability of religious beliefs and dogmas as sources of legitimation for actions in the wider social sphere; it is not merely the decline of religious institutions as a means of administration and control of other, non-religious institutions.

As Budd points out "many sociologists believe that structural differentiation does not entail secularization".[10] They argue that the fact that such spheres as education and the law are taken out of the hands of religious bodies merely means that these religious institutions perform a "limited but purer, and hence more powerful, role".[11] Yet this argument makes little sociological sense. As Budd rightly points out: "making values pure and divorcing them from social contexts and pressures seems likely to weaken and not strengthen the likelihood of them becoming a basis for action".[12] The essential feature to notice here is that it seems

likely that if the religious dogmas and beliefs of a society are no longer felt to be binding on the legal, economic and other institutions because of structural differentiation; then, the very sacredness and unassailability of these dogmas is likely to become less a matter of social agreement. Structural differentiation leads to a de facto recognition that the religious institution is not the sole authority in all matters. Structural differentiation itself creates alternative authorities in the legal, economic and other spheres. Thus existing beliefs may be questioned and alternative orthodoxies may develop.

In summary, structural differentiation does not mean that the ideology underpinning social institutions is no longer religious: it simply means that institutional control is no longer operated by religious functionaries. However, structural differentiation may well be a contributary factor in the secularization process. But secularization is not merely a shift in institutional control, but also a change in the beliefs which are the legitimation of the institutions.

Thus, secularization is an element of social change. It may occur on its own or as part of a wider process of social change. It is thus reasonable to expect the process to be influenced by the pre-existing society. As secularization is an element of social change it can be illuminated by looking at what kind of society is being changed. In a simple form this can be illustrated by the historical generalisation put forward by Martin: "where there exists one religion possessed of a monopoly

society splits into two warring sides".[13] Of those sides, one will be "dedicated to religion".[14] We must take note of this when we consider the position in Turkey, with the initial qualification that Ottoman Turkey may not have been such a monopolistic system as may appear on a superficial reading of the facts. The political privileges awarded to the Christian minorities, along with the split between Shi'i and Sunni groups within Islam may mean that Islam as a whole, or any one part thereof, was unable to occupy a monopolistic position.

The position of religion within society after secularization differs; and these differences have been set out by Martin. He has described a number of typical situations and it may be helpful to outline his major types here. The American pattern has taken shape following the American Revolution of 1776. In this type "religion as such is unproblematic and non-political" although "different denominations tend to support one party rather than another".[15] The British pattern developed as the outcome of the English Civil War of 1642-60. In it "religion as such is politically unproblematic, though certain partial alignments of denominations and parties occur".[16] The difference between the American and British pattern is slight but telling. In the American pattern religion is non-political, but in the British pattern there are partial "alignments of denominations and parties". Yet these two types have in common the fact that they find religion "as such" politically unproblematic.

The outcome of the French Revolution of 1789, and its sequels, gave rise to the French (Latin) pattern. In this type "religion as such is frequently a political issue". This being a result of the fact that "coherent and massive secularism confronts coherent and massive religiosity".[17]

Finally, we come to the Russian pattern which is the outcome of the Russian Revolution of 1917. In this pattern "religion is officially privatized and both beliefs and institutions are subject to massive attack and massive erosion". But, at the same time, "the internal ethos of the religious institutions is not substantially diminished".[18] It will be obvious that this is the most radical of Martin's types of post-secularization situation. It will be of interest, later, to see which, if any, of these types best fits the present situation in Turkey.

We noted above that Martin has criticized the concept of secularization as such: claiming that it is not a scientific concept but merely a "tool of counter-religious ideologies".[19] It is now time to give a little more space to his objections. If they do not convince us of the uselessness of the concept of secularization as a means of understanding they will at least serve the useful purpose of pointing up for us the difficulties and pitfalls involved in using the concept.

Martin points out that generally secularization is taken not merely to refer to "the decline of an institution in this or that respect, but the decline of

religious institutions considered as a class".[20] Here it must be remembered, if this position is to be maintained, that in secularization we are referring to a decline in all religious institutions. Not simply a decline in one type of religious institution, nor yet a decline in one aspect of all religious institutions. This may enable us to distinguish between secularization and a shift from one type of institutional religion to another. But Martin goes on to state that there is no single process affecting all religious institutions in the same way because religious institutions have no common characteristics which can be affected by a single process in a uniform way. As we will be concerned with a specific situation such general objections need not concern us: we will not be making statements about religious institutions as a whole.[21]

Martin warns us that "all institutions expand and decline for a wide variety of reasons and religious institutions are no exception."[22] We must attempt to be conscious of this. Causal links between secularization and the decline of a religious institution must be shown to exist: they must not simply be assumed. For it is possible that the decline in this or that religious institution, or even in all such institutions, may not be the result of secularization byt may conceivably be due to another cause.

Martin tells us that he intends to argue against the view that "where religion is weak one has a sure indication of a developed society firmly orientated

towards the future".[23] Again, this position, which Martin argues is a false one, can be stated by claiming that if society would "once educate people properly, in the neutral scientific atmosphere congenial to rational values, and religion will steadily lose its grip and mankind no longer be troubled by bad dreams".[24] One instinctively rejects this position because although the "scientific atmosphere" which facilitates rational enquiry may be "neutral" human life is anything but neutral. Human beings do not experience their lives to be neutral. In addition this position places too much emphasis on religion as a system of explanation of the world.[25] But "believers are not failed rationalists but human beings".[26] It is not justified to hold that being a nuclear physicist and a believer are mutually incompatible. In addition the views quoted above do seem to betray a bias which is anti-religious, rather than a neutral attitude to religion.

Finally, in this regard, let us note that Martin shares our worry regarding the distinction between the sacred and the profane. No sets of criteria, he suggests, can be used with any confidence to distinguish between the religious and the secular.[27] We could easily substitute the word profane for the secular in this context. For the secular is that which is not sacred or religious: and this definition could equally apply to the profane. But there is some doubt as to whether a strict dichotomy between the sacred and the profane or the religious and the secular may be maintained with regard to Islam, which is what most concerns us in

our study of Turkey.

Now we shall turn our attention to the concept of secularization in detail with specific emphasis upon the thinking of Durkheim. We do so because, as will be seen in the next section, it is the thought of Durkheim which was most influential for those within Turkey who gave an early impetus to the secularization movement in that country.

For Durkheim a "secularized society implies a lack of universally held religious beliefs".[28] This would be generally accepted. Where Durkheim differs from common practice is that he does not rely upon statistics of church attendance and such like for his measurement of secularization. Durkheim measured the secularization of society according to five elements:

1) the church loses its temporal power;
2) religion allows itself to become the object of scientific enquiry;
3) religious institutions become incapable of enforcing laws relating to sacrilege;
4) religious institutions are unable to control the lives of individuals though this is the only sphere left to them;
5) religion fails to hold the most intelligent members of society.[29]

This particular characterization is especially useful as it has a wider, cross-cultural application than do definitions or measures involving statistics of attendance at religious meetings. In many societies, both Christian and non-Christian, statistics of attendance at acts of worship are, at best, partial. In many places, such statistics do not exist at all. Thus, there is considerable merit in the guidelines given by Durkheim.

Having said what secularization is and how it is to be observed, we can now go on to ask why secularization should take place at all. On this point Durkheim's suggestion is unsatisfactory. For explanation he appeals to "nature" as the reason. Secularization is, simply because that's the way things are. His views in this respect are aptly stated by Pickering: "the scientific Durkheim, witnout any clearly enunciated reason appeals to 'nature' - the course of events - a mysterious force over which man has no control - to explain secularization".[30] Durkheim's unsatisfactory conclusion on this point, having been thus stated, need not detain us any longer.

Where, we may ask, will this secularization process lead us? Durkheim has an answer to this question. But his conclusion is itself not without some difficulty. His approach was somewhat paradoxical: "religion is dying and society is becoming secular; yet, on the other hand, religion is alive and will always be a component of social life".[31] This is a great problem in the theory of secularization: is it perhaps that we simply cannot know where the process is leading us? It may be answered that sociology is not predictive, in the sense in which the physical sciences are: nevertheless, it was one of Durkheim's contentions that sociology would become as scientific - and thus predictive - as, say, physics or chemistry. The truth is that this difficulty arises out of Durkheim's attitude to religion. The seeds of this paradox are to be found there. Durkheim, Pickering tells us, had an ambivalent attitude towards religion. This involved "a denial of its truth-claims, on the one

hand, and a worship of its practical effects, on the other".[32] For Durkheim the claims were not true: certainly they were also unprovable by using the methods of sociology. But at the same time he held that religion fulfilled a valuable role in society. The question of whether a totally non-religious society is possible is more a question for the philosopher than for the social scientist. All that is necessary for us to remember is that Durkheim is unclear as to the future of religion and whether or not it will remain a force, or at least an element, in society. He is unclear as to whether religion can be or will become wholly non-social and entirely personal.

Finally Durkheim reminds us of age-long secularization, as against the shorter term, more rapid phenomenon of modern history. It is this age-long process which forms the back-drop to more modern events. For that reason we state it here, though it is modern events with which we shall deal later in this study. As Pickering explains it: "for Durkheim the development of social institutions in the history of mankind has been accompanied by a regression of religion".[33] Durkheim's use of the word "regression" in consideration of this matter is somewhat confusing as it seems to imply a return to something. But Durkheim's point is not that religion is returning to a previous state, but that it is moving constantly further from its original state as an all-encompassing institution. Durkheim would hold that religion has never been in such a weak position in society as it occupies at present. It would thus have been

better had he referred to secularization as a constant decline or constant limiting of religion. This comes much closer to his view than the word regression. This can be put another way to stress the age-long nature of the process but which avoids reference to regression. In developing societies, Durkheim tells us:

> there is a decreasing number of collective beliefs and sentiments which are both collective enough and strong enough to take on a religious character.[34]

Thus, religion loses both power and influence within the wider society and even loses its influence over the individual: particularly, as has been mentioned, over the more educated members of society.

We have thus outlined some widely accepted definitions of secularization in occidental sociology. We have also noted Martin's cautions that the concept of secularization itself may be a little weak. Indeed, we have noted Martin's claim that secularization may be nothing other than a tool of "counter-religious ideologies". More particularly we have seen how Durkheim characterized and measured secularization; in addition to noting some problematic areas in Durkheim's thoughts on the subject.

Thus we can arrive at a satisfactory working definition of secularization. For the purposes of this study it will be taken to mean the process whereby various areas of social activity, along with the ideology and legitimation underlying them, are removed from the control of religious authorities.

We are now in a position to turn our attention to

the modern period in Turkey. We shall begin, in the next section, by looking at the ideological and theoretical developments. We shall examine the ideas and beliefs which lie behind the practical measures which have been taken. In the third section it is those practical measures which will be our concern. In the fourth section we will look at the situation in Turkey since 1950 in an attempt to assess the outcome of the reforms, and to see if modern Turkey is, in fact, a secular state. Pickering warns us that: "religions are much more resilient than is often imagined".[35] Is the secular republic of Turkey proof of this fact?

SECTION TWO

SECULARISM IN

TURKISH THOUGHT

In this section we shall examine some major intellectual elements in Turkish secularism. This, along with the sociological material already discussed, will provide a back-drop against which to view the practical measures to be mentioned later.

At the turn of the century few Anatolian villagers "possessed any real sense of national identity"[1] but did have a sense of identifying with Islam and of resentment of the Western infidel.[2] Even in the 1960s for most Turks only a Muslim was a real Turk.[3] In addition to which at the village level "religion was highly fatalistic, highly traditional, and associated with massive superstition".[4] This end of the intellectual spectrum is often neglected in talk of the background of Turkish secularism. It is included briefly here to show up, as it were in relief, the ideas to be mentioned shortly.

Fatalism is often used simply as a derogatory term. Before passing on it is worth noting that in fact fatalism and predestination, as ideas, have two effects. As Robinson explains:

> It may spur a rising people to enormous effort because of conviction in their manifest destiny to become superior; or in the face of reverses, the same philosophy may provide rationalization for resignation to defeat and inactivity.[5]

However, change when it came originated not in the village but in the minds of urban intellectuals.

With the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the

nineteenth century it was generally appreciated that reform was necessary. Groups differed greatly however as to how much reform was needed, and in which direction this ought to move. Thus, for example, the Young Ottomans accepted the need for reform but would only approve of those Tanzimat reforms which were in conformity with the Şeriat.[6] In another response to Tanzimat reforms Namik Kemal argued that Islam was not the cause of the underdevelopment of the Ottoman Empire, rather it was nonadherence to the Şeriat which had caused the relative decline of the Ottoman state.[7] By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, there had emerged three 'schools' in the attempt "to find a new foundation for the political existence and cultural reconstruction of the Turks".[8] By this time the problem was not simply seen as that of the decline of Ottoman power; at this stage the problem was seen as that of the "entire traditional existence" of the Turks.[9] We can now turn to look at these three groups in turn.

The first of these groups can be termed the Westernists, though, as with the names for all the groups, the term was originally coined by the group's critics. The Westernists were the most loose of the three groups, not showing the almost sect-like cohesion which the Islamists and the Turkists displayed.[10] For this group the main problem was to cast aside the old system of values.[11] If this were done, a new morality could then be developed to be erected on the foundation not of the Qur'an, but of Western values.[12] For the Westernists, then, modernization was far more than a material matter, it

was seen, rather, as a cultural and moral issue.[13]

Among the Westernists there are two prominent figures that may be considered in turn. They are Tevfik Fikret and Abdullah Cevdet.[14]

Tevfik Fikret (1867-1915) sought, through his poetry, to teach this new morality.[15] Yet this new teaching was not made in the mould of the religious moralists. He preached a secular morality in which: "unlimited freedom would be recognized to the individual for the interpretation of religious beliefs".[16] Most of the verse written by Fikret prior to 1908 contained vehement denunciations of tradition and obscurantism.[17] Apart from an almost Lutheran insistence on the individual's right to interpret religious dogmas, other ideals were also promoted by Fikret. Amongst these ideals were:

> belief in man's dignity, the brotherhood of man, man's capacity for perfection, love and peace, individual liberty, and the infinite capacity of Reason to transform the world.[18]

One cannot help but wonder how the acceptance of such abstract ideas as "love" or the dignity of man could have solved the pressing problems of the Empire, no matter how laudable such ideals may be in themselves. Yet one of the most remarkable things about Fikret was the fact that he managed to present this secular morality without his youthful readers feeling that the ideals he presented "smacked of anything foreign".[19] Yet foreign they were. Fikret was promoting nothing less than a new view of the West, whose four foundations were "individualism, liberalism, pragmatism, and puritanism".[20]

Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) believed that unless

the great mass of the population were enlightened, then all attempts at reform would be doomed to come to nothing.[21] He considered that the people of Turkey were suffering from the same problems as those of other Muslim peoples.[22] Those problems were "technological, scientific, economic and even biological degeneracy".[23] Among the causes of these problems were indolence and ignorance.[24] Also they suffered from holding to superstitions which were identified, Cevdet thought erroneously, with the religion of Islam, accompanied by the population's "self-subordination" to religious officials who Cevdet considered to be both stupid and degenerate.[25] Despite stating the problem in such an all-embracing way, Cevdet was confident that there was a solution. This was to:

> push, pull, if necessary lash the people into moving, working, earning, seeing, and thinking like the infidels of the West.[26]

Despite the way in which the problem was formulated above it must not be imagined that Cevdet was hostile to Islam, or, for that matter, to religion in general.[27] He knew both the Islamic sciences and Arabic and Persian literature well.[28] In addition he showed a great deal of interest in the writings of Muhammed Abduh and other Islamic reformers.

Having looked briefly at some opinions of the Westernists we can look to the second of the three 'schools'. Those were the Islamists and they can be further divided into three separate groups, which to avoid confusion we will deal with separately.

The first of the three Islamist groups is of limited

importance and need not detain us long. They called themselves the Islamic Society of Learned Men (Cemiyet-i Ilmiye-i Islamiye) and their most prominent figure was Mustafa Sabri.[29] Sabri became famous as the collaborationist Şeyhul-Islam during the Allied occupation of Istanbul following the First World War (December 1918 to August 1923).[30] This group simply pledged themselves to combat the view being expressed in some quarters that it was Islam which was the obstacle to progress.[31]

The second group of Islamists was known as the Muhammadan Union.[32] The most prominent member of this group, a Bektashi dervish named Vahdeti was a self-styled champion of the cause of orthodoxy and of "revolutionary Islamic Internationalism".[33] Vahdeti was found guilty of instigating a mutiny of the troops in 1909 and, along with other leaders of the Union, was executed following a court martial.[34] The mutineers were mainly Albanian troops of the First Army Corps which was stationed in Istanbul.[35] Their demands were quite simple: "The Şeriat is in danger, we want the Şeriat!"[36] The Union argued that as a democracy should follow the will of the people, and as the majority of the population were Muslims, so the law of the land ought to be the Şeriat.[37] It was not enough to base certain laws, say relating to the family, marriage and inheritance, on Islamic customs. Unless the Şeriat were enforced in its entirety, they argued, there could be no pretence that there was an Islamic state and that the Şeriat was being applied.[38]

The only long-term survivor of this group was Said Nursi (1867-1960).[39] Nursi, known to his followers as

Bedi-uz-Zaman (The Wonder of the Time) was still leading a politico-religious group at the time of his death.[40] We shall look at the views of this group, known as the Nurcus, in some detail in Section Four.

Now, however, we must turn our attention to the final Islamist group to be considered here. This was the group gathered around the journal Sirat-i Mustakim.[41] The outstanding figure of this group was the poet Mehmed Akif (1870-1936).[42] Akif considered the main problem to be the existence of a gulf between the intellectuals and the masses.[43] On the one hand the intellectuals found the solution to their problems in imitating the West, while on the other, the introduction of European ideas and methods was considered, by the masses, to be the cause of their problems.[44]

This group gave considerable thought as to what it would be possible and permissible to borrow from the West.[45] Obviously great caution would be needed to ensure that only those elements of European civilization which were 'good' should be adopted. The difficulty was in deciding which elements were 'good' and which were not. Musa Kazim, a writer associated with this group, declared that: "We have to adopt only the sciences (ilim) and the industries (fen) of Europe."[46] Other than this Westernization was impossible,,even in those matters of custom which were believed to be outside the Seriat.[47] Yet even this problem was problematic. The Islamists saw that the growth of science in Europe had caused the decline of religion, not the other way round.[48] They considered that this would not be too great a problem in

Christianity, which tolerated a certain degree of distinction between religion and the world.[49] However, as Islam covered all of life, as well as the after-life, then it would be totally unacceptable for Western science to be the cause of a spread of irreligiosity in the Islamic world.[50]

Yet such attitudes as these did not carry the day. In part this was due to the relative decline in the position of the ulema in the nineteenth century. Previously, "through their control of education, of the judiciary and of the administrative network" the ulema had acted as agents of the state.[51] After the middle of the nineteenth century the ulema were gradually squeezed out of central positions in the bureaucracy.[52] They remained as officials at the local level, but were replaced nationally by a group of professional, career civil-servants. This simply removed them from the centre of the debate over modernization and thus limited the effectiveness of their contributions.

The third 'school' of thought, and ultimately the most influential were the Turkists who emerged as a response to the Westernists and the Islamists.[53] Turkism developed from a group of intellectuals who manifested: "a romantic, idealist, and nationalist tendency; they were...pre-occupied...with European idealistic philosophies".[54] Not to be confused with either pan-Turkism or pan-Turanism, the Turkists were the first Turkish nationalists.[55] Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) was the most prominent Turkist and the major influence upon the development of the ideas an underlying Turkish secularism.[56] A good deal of his

thought can be regarded as central here.

Perhaps a word would be appropriate here to distinguish between Turkism, pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism. We have noted that Turkism emerged as a response to the Westernists and the Islamists. Pan-Turkism, on the other hand, originated in the Russian Empire and was developed in opposition to Czarist rule.[57] Pan-Turanism, in contrast, originated in Hungary as an alternative to the growing ideology of pan-Slavism.[58] The difference between the Turkists and the pan-Turkists can be seen most clearly in their understanding of nationality. For the pan-Turkists it meant race, whereas for the Turkists it meant culture.[59] Despite the differences, however, Gokalp was influenced by the pan-Turkists particularly when they were at their peak during the First World War.[60]

Before turning our attention to Gokalp, however, a word or two on the contrast between Turkey and France may be instructive as many of the Turkish intelligentsia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were greatly influenced by French thought. Gokalp, as we shall see, was no exception to this.

Laicism emerged as a concept from French constitutional developments in the nineteenth century.[61] It referred, according to Mardin, to "the necessity that the state refrain from lending its positive support to any one religious denomination".[62] More exactly, in French *laique* has an "association with anti-clericalism and the separation of church and state".[63] But any term or movement could not simply be transported from France to Turkey due to the significant difference between the two

places. This is brought out by Mardin:

> In France religion and the state already operated on two distinct institutional registers and were eventually separated in the law of the land. In Turkey a limb of the state was torn out of its body when laicism became the state policy.[64]

As Feyzioglu also points out, the scope of secularizing measures required by an Islamic society are much greater than those required by a Christian society.[65] This will be demonstrated later when we encounter the actual reforms carried out by Ataturk.

At this point we may consider the thought of Ziya Gokalp in some detail. He was "the most original and influential among the Turkish writers of the 20th century".[66] In him was found the best formulator of the major trends of the Republican period.[67] Durkheim was Gokalp's principal teacher.[68] This can be seen in his insistence that "religion divides everything into two categories - the sacred and the profane".[69] This idea comes direct from Durkheim and, as noted earlier, is not readily applicable to the Islamic tradition.

Religion held an important place in Gokalp's understanding of society. He held that:

> All institutions of primitive societies...spring from religion and acquire their power and value from this source of sacredness.[70]

This habit of religion's investing other institutions with supernatural or charismatic power was generally unproblematic. However, it did become harmful when it was "extended to worldly or secular, and especially to material, institutions".[71] This is because it would prevent these worldly institutions from adapting to the

expediences of everyday life.[72] This demonstrates how Gokalp saw the conservative aspect of religion working as a brake on development, but he also saw the possibility and even the necessity of using religion to develop national identities. As he says:

> Religion is the most important factor in the creation of national consciousness as it unites men through common sentiments and beliefs.[73]

Thus we can understand why Gokalp could not remove the Islamic strand from his thinking. To do so would have been a disaster. Religion was necessary as a means of binding men together and providing them with a common outlook.

Gokalp's concern for religion and social factors in his thinking on reforming Turkey is explained by his desire to create a nation in Turkey, and not merely a state. He puts the distinction like this:

> A collectivity united by political mores and subject to a political authority is called a state. The collectivity which is the product and the union of cultural mores under a cultural authority is called a nation.[74]

The reforms Gokalp was interested in seeing were those aimed at the entire culture and not simply at political institutions.

Gokalp recognised that in the days of the Union of Progress there were two key schools of thought, one believing Islam to be compatible with modern civilization and the other thinking it was not.[75] He saw it as a major part of his task to attempt to discover which of these arguments was true.

He believed that the "fundamentals of the faith" were not subject to the laws of evolution which governed social institutions.[76] Indeed:

> A religion ceases to be religion when its ultimate principles are believed not to be absolute and unchangeable.[77]

But Gokalp did not go so far as to state the position as seen by Rosenthal who argues that:

> Islam as a political and religious unity cannot, at least in its classical medieval form, merge with Western civilization as it is today.[78]

The problem was a difficult one to state just in black and white terms. As Gokalp recognised:

> People can neither entirely drop the religion they held sacred, nor can they dispense with the necessities of contemporary civilization.[79]

The answer to Turkey's dilemma was not to be found in so stark a choice. He recognised that Islam "takes ethical and legal rules as religious rules and thus makes them sacred".[80] So Gokalp tried to find the choice as one between different elements within Islam. He attempted to distinguish between the fundamental beliefs of Islam and "the elements that depend on time and place" and may change with the development of society.[81] He cited the principles of fikh which are "subject to the transformations taking place in...society, and hence are subject to change along with society".[82] He also argued that certain aspects of Islam "particularly the commands associated with the proper Islamic organization of society"[83] were actually elements of Arabic culture and had no place in "'pristine' Islam".[84] Gokalp emphasised that for him Islam was a religion that "demanded of its

followers 'faith', and it did not confine its followers to any form of social organisation",[85] as Mardin puts it. His major contribution then, was to argue that there was in Islam both the essential and the non-essential. This would allow the reformers to replace or abandon the non-essential elements and to adopt some aspects of Western culture without needing to abandon Islam in its entirety.

One of the non-essential elements according to Gokalp was the Arabic language. He had dreamt "of a country where the Qur'an would be recited in Turkish".[86] This particular dream was to be answered in the reforms of the Kemalist era. He also spoke out against the making of laws by the Sultan-Caliph and called for the secularization of law.[87] This call too was answered in the early days of the Republic with both the secularizing of law and the abolition of the Sultanate and then the Caliphate. However, Gokalp did envisage Islamic education as a basic ingredient in the education of Turkish youth.[88] This was both out of a desire to create bonds of common belief amongst citizens and because Gokalp never rejected the essentials of Islamic faith. However, he never stated what he held the essentials of Islam to be, and had he done so any definition he put forward would doubtless have lessened the acceptability of his arguments.

Thus Gokalp proclaimed the "threefold goal of Westernization, Turkization, and Islamization".[89] Westernization in the form of promoting the methods and the material aspects of Western civilization. Turkization in the form of the promotion of the vernacular language

even in worship, along with a general promotion of native Turkish culture. The essential and absolute elements of Islam were also to be upheld as the religious ideology to live alongside the material aspects of Western civilization. As this excluded Islam from state administration and from the organization of society religious belief was inevitably to become a more personal affair. Mardin aptly summarises Gokalp's blueprint as follows:

> To draw out the latent Turkish culture of the Turkish nation, to establish a Turkish state based on it, to accept Western civilization and to make Islam a matter of conscience, a private belief.[90]

Gokalp was a member of the drafting committee for the constitution of the Turkish Republic of 1924.[91] But apart from this he did not take a particularly active role in the reform movements. Indeed, his "relations with Ataturk were never very close, partly because of his academic reticence".[92] Gokalp was more of a thinker than a man of action. Ataturk, on the other hand was a man of action. It is now time to turn our attention to the thoughts of Ataturk and his fellow reformers.

One of the most interesting studies which would be of great help in our understanding of the reforms would be a study into the early thougnt of Ataturk. Unfortunately the basic materials for such a study are not available. Such a study, on the other hand, would probably show but little development in his thought. Mardin believes that he had "made up his mind very early concerning the Turkey he visualised in the future".[93]

During the reform period Ataturk never engaged in

anti-religious propaganda as often found in the Soviet Union.[94] He was, in fact, "by no means opposed to the religion of his people".[95] Rather he wished to remove the centurion-old traditions which hampered freedom and progress.[96] He sought to Turkify Islam and make it acceptable as both a natural and a rational religion.[97] This Turkification of Islam was not simply for the sake of Turkish nationalism.[98] His purpose was rather to "Turkify Islam for the sake of religious enlightenment".[99] It must be remembered in this respect that when the Qur'an was read and the sermon preached in Arabic this was simply unintelligable to the vast majority of Turks. By stripping Islam of the liturgical use of Arabic Ataturk was enabling the ordinary Turk to gain fuller intellectual access to his religion. Mustafa Kemal was convinced of the reasonableness of Islam: the idea became "a deistic conviction" in his mind.[100] As Berkes explains, for Ataturk:

> the abolition of the Caliphate meant liberating Islam from its unreasonable traditional associates and preparing the ground for its emergence as a rational religion.[101]

Following the reforms Kemalists tried to find ways in which religion could survive in spite of being separated from its customary setting.[102] Mustafa Kemal was personally convinced "that a drive for an enlightened and humanized Islam was absolutely necessary".[103] This necessity was based on what Kemal regarded as "the deep ignorance of the interpreters of religion".[104] Yet it will be noticed that this new attitude favoured the continued life of only certain aspects of Islam. The less rational, more

devotional aspects of worship in the Dervish orders was not to occupy a place in the re-shaped Islam which was to persist after the reforms. There was to be no dependance on saints or shaikhs because Ataturk wished to inculcate:

> a spirit of independence, a rational 'scientific' approach to life, and a positive feeling that the individual is capable of shaping his own destiny.[105]

Islamic ideas of predestination and of fatalism were to have no place in the new atmosphere.

True, religion was granted and indeed guaranteed freedom and protection.[106] But this was only as long as "it was not utilised to promote any social or political ideology having institutional implications".[107] In Kemalist secularism it was the ideology of Islamic polity which was being rejected.[108] In 1931, for example, Laicism was defined as a doctrine whereby religion should be a matter of personal discretion concerned with individual conscience not with state or public matters.[109] As Schimmel comments:

> This betrays a fundamental misconception of the ideal of Islam which sees in religion and state only two aspects of the same reality.[110]

Although Ataturk certainly did not want to destroy Islam but simply to disestablish it,[111] yet the Republic is firmly based upon the belief that political power comes from the will of the people "rather than from some religious or divine source".[112] Again the insistence of Berkes that this was not a matter of separating distinct institutions but of "bifurcating a single system" is surely apt.[113]

This particular aim of Ataturk's is, then, quite

clear. What is more open to question however is how realistic it is. To what extent Islam may be deprived of its political element is open to question. Is it possible in this way to destroy one element without irreparably damaging the whole edifice? This question is still, surely, an open one. The Kemalists would claim that they were re-moulding Islam to present it as a rational religion devoid of both traditional factors leading to under-development and devoid of political involvement. But is this merely a change in the presentation or is it actually a partial destruction of Islam?

While it is not the purpose of this study to attempt to answer these questions it is important that they be included at this point since they concern the fundamental assumptions and ideas of the Kemalist reforms. Any assessment of those reforms will not be complete until the Islamic world has reached a consensus answer to these questions.

As we shall see, despite statements by Feyzioglu that "faith is a private matter beyond the reach of state power"[114] it has proved the case that: "Islam in Turkey is far too virile for secularism to ignore and too unpredictable to hold free rein".[115] From theory we will now turn our attention to the actions of the reformers. Following which, we will look to the results as found in Modern Turkish Life.

SECTION THREE

SECULARISM IN TURKEY

TO 1950

The Turks adopted Islam when they came into contact with Muslims as they migrated Westwards.[1] Having done so the concept of *jihad*, or Holy War, gave the martial Turks a religious reason for going into battle in addition to their territorial incentive.[2] Non-military aspects of society also benefited as the *ulema* moved to organise the administration of the new territories conquered in the early days of the Ottoman Empire.[3] In the following pages we shall look at events at the end of the Ottoman period which were aimed at changing Turkey to a secular rather than an Islamic state.

The secularizing process is a long one in Turkey stretching back before the time of Ataturk. It may be traced to the reign of Sultan Selim I (1512-1520) who established a distinction between theoretical and practical authority. After Selim I the judicial and theological hierarchy of religious scholars were subject to the authority of the *mufti* of Istanbul as *Shaikh al-Islam*.[4] But the authority of this official was simply theoretical as he had the power to issue *fotvas*, but he could not insist on their being obeyed.[5] The process of secularizing the law has been under way in a real sense in Turkey since the beginning of the last century.[6] In the Tanzimat period the virtues of behaving in accordance with Islamic customs was stressed at the same time as laws were being adopted from the West.[7] The details of these events will be examined later.

Although secularizing reforms quickened pace in the Ataturk period such measures were not totally unprecedented. Even in the Ataturk period it was made easier for Turks to accept the reforms by Ataturk's policy of spreading the reforms over a period and introducing them one at a time.[8]

In the Tanzimat period two mentalities became increasingly estranged and mutually hostile.[9] These two positions were those of the traditionalists and those of the secularists or modernists. In this period the secularizing of the state took the form of creating dualities and dichotomies within institutions, not the form of a split between church and state.[10] This emphasis on separation and the creation of a series of dichotomies was replaced in the Kemalist period by an emphasis on unification and the resolution of the dichotomies in favour of the secular structures.[11] This shift was partly the result of a change of attitude towards Islam after 1908 when the hope of reforming Islam into a typically Turkish institution was replaced by a firm policy of laicism.[12]

As Berkes points out, if we accept that there were two institutions, church and state, which needed to be separated we will misjudge the events in Turkey.[13] The new Republican regime attempted to act on its constitutional mandate of freedom of conscience by establishing government agencies to help and encourage the people to approach Islam through reason rather than tradition.[14] Kemalists would claim that Ataturk performed a service for religion from saving it from

political exploitation.[15] But Millar sees things differently. He argues that although an atheistic ideology never became established in Turkey, religious leaders came to have very limited influence on civil affairs and social questions, except in the more remote rural areas.[16] Webster also notes this, remarking that the sole aim of the reforms was "the secularization of political life".[17] Certainly it is true that religion was steadily removed from any position of political importance. Whether this move was aimed at being in the service of true religion, as Feyzioglu suggests,[18] by releasing religion from political exploitation is more debatable.

But, as we shall see, the elevation of the people and their will to a position of supremacy was an early measure taken by the Grand National Assembly.[19] This both legitimized the revolution and made the revolution a new source of legitimacy. It is by reference to the revolution that Turks justify their religious reforms.[20] This aptly reflects the pragmatic nature of the Kemalist reforms in that Turks now support them by reference to an event rather than to an ideology.

Before looking at other areas in some detail, the attitude of the Kemalists to history is worth noting. Kemalism tries to diminish the importance of the Muslim and Ottoman periods of Turkish history.[21] Great emphasis is given, rather, to the history of the pre-Islamic Turks and to the history of ancient groups in Anatolian history such as the Hittites.[22] Such a change in historical emphasis seems to have been thought

desirable to facilitate the reform of contemporary Turkey.

It is beyond the scope of this study to look at how the Ataturk reforms were seen from the perspective of those living in other Muslim countries. One item is interesting to note however. As the Kemalist revolution came at a time, following the First World War, when much of Turkey was occupied by European troops, the revolution was welcomed by most Muslim countries as a move against imperialism.[23] However, this initial approval may not be assumed to have applied also to the various reforms proposed after Turkey had forced the European powers to withdraw. Even within Turkey there were definite Islamic over-tones to the liberation movement in the early 1920s. As Heper states:

> If a significant Islamic revival ever occurred in Turkey it was during the war of Independence... Islam was a means to mobilize the masses against 'the infidel'. It was used to legitimize the national struggle.[24]

Having made these preliminary remarks we can now move to look at the reforms in individual areas.

Ottoman Military Reforms:

Much of the early attempts at reform in the Ottoman Empire were prompted by military necessity. This is equally true of the first deliberate and conscious attempt at a partial Westernization policy.[25] This occurred early in the eighteenth century after the signing of two treaties gave official recognition to two humiliating defeats for the Empire.[26] These were the treaty of Carlowitz (1699), recognising defeat by the Austrian Empire, and the treaty of Passarowitz (1718), recognising

defeat at the hands of the Russian Empire.[27] The example set by Peter the Great of Russia persuaded certain circles within the Ottoman Empire that a policy of vigorous Westernization and modernization, particularly in the army, would enable the Ottomans to become, once again, the terror of its neighbours.[28] As early as 1716 a French officer named de Rochefort submitted a plan to the authorities for a corps of European engineering officers in the Ottoman army.[29] We shall see throughout the military reforms the important part played by individual European soldiers. The majority of these were to be French until they were replaced as the primary source of assistance by the Prussians in the nineteenth century. De Rochefort's proposals, however, came to nothing at this early stage.[30]

The next attempt at reform centres upon yet another Frenchman. This was the nobleman Count de Bonneval who became a convert to Islam bearing the name Ahmed Pasha Bonneval.[31] In September 1731, Topal Osman Pasha, the Grand Vezir, gave him the task of reforming the Corps of Bombardiers along European lines.[32] The significant difference between this and the previous episode mentioned is that on this occasion the initiative came from the Ottoman government, in the shape of the Grand Vezir. The other difference is that this initiative bore fruit. In 1734 a school of gunnery was opened to train bombardiers.[33] The following year, in 1735, de Bonneval was given the rank of Pasha of two tails, and the military rank of Chief Bombardier.[34] However, the new school was short lived. When the Janissaries found out about the school

they opposed it and forced it to be closed.[35]

In 1773 a fresh attempt was made. In that year, with the help of Baron de Tott, a new school of mathematics was opened for the navy.[36] In addition to this the Baron assisted in the formation and training of a new corps of engineers and artillery, and reorganized the gun-foundry.[37] In 1775 de Tott retired to France.[38] At this point de Tott's assistant took over the running of the school.[39] He was a Scotsman by the name of Campbell who became known as Ingiliz Mustafa after he adopted Islam.[40]

These measures were given added impetus in 1783 when the Russians conquered the Crimea.[41] At this point the Turks were being officially encouraged in their efforts by the French who feared a Russian threat to their interests in the Levant.[42] A year later a new engineering course was opened at the urging of the Grand Vezir Halil Hamid Pasha.[43] The course had two French instructors and, because of the language problem, a local Armenian to act as interpreter.[44] However, all the military schools became inactive in 1787 when the Ottomans became involved in a war against Austria and Russia.[45] They remained inactive until peace was resumed in 1792, at which point a new Sultan, Selim III, made a fresh start.[46]

In 1791, Selim III (reigned 1789-1807) commanded twenty two individuals to write down their views on the causes of weakness within the Empire.[47] These individuals comprising civil, military and religious dignitaries were all agreed on the need for military

reform.[48] However this was as far as unanimity went. One group of those consulted by the Sultan thought that the army should be reformed, reverting to old Ottoman military methods in an effort to recapture the golden age of Ottoman power.[49] A second faction considered that the army could not be reformed and that the best thing the Sultan could do would be to disband the army and start again to create a totally new army trained, armed and equipped along European lines.[50] It was towards the latter view that Selim, himself inclined.[51] Thus it was that in 1792-3 Selim issued a series of commands which aimed at establishing a new, regular, corps of infantry organised like those of Europe.[52] In order to furnish, in part, the money which would be required by this new force a series of fresh taxes were introduced on commodities such as tobacco, spirits and coffee.[53] Central features of Selim's plans were new military and naval schools.[54] These offered courses in gunnery, fortification, navigation and ancillary sciences and relied heavily on the use of French teachers and instructors.[55] French cooperation was interrupted, understandably, by the Franco-Turkish War (1798-1802) but was later resumed when the climate had improved between the two powers.[56] Prior to the War, after 1792 instructors in the military and naval schools were appointed directly by the government of the French Republic.[57]

It is important to get these events in perspective. The new changes were confined to the military, certainly. But, the social implications of these moves were far

greater than may be imagined. These reforms created a new element within Ottoman society.[58] That element was, as Lewis points out, a group of young naval and army officers:

> familiar with some aspects of western civilization through study, reading, and personal contact, acquainted with at least one western language - usually French - and accustomed to look up to western experts as their mentors and guides to new and better ways.[59]

This was in marked contrast to the traditional and popular view that the West could and did have nothing of any value to teach Ottoman Muslims.

The next period of interest begins with the mutiny of the Janissaries on the 15th of June, 1826, in response to a proposal for military reform from the then Sultan Mahmud II (reigned 1808-1839).[60] This was certainly by far from the first time the Janissaries had revolted to impose their (conservative) will on the Sultans. But on this occasion Mahmud was ready for their challenge and met it head on. Guns loaded with grape-shot had previously been placed in Mahmud's palace, and when the Janissaries assembled in the Hippodrome, as they habitually did when in revolt, the guns opened fire on them.[61] The firing continued for about thirty minutes by which time virtually all the Janissaries had been killed.[62] The same day a proclamation was issued abolishing the Corps of Janissaries.[63] Mahmud could now enjoy a freer hand than any reforming Sultan before him. The Janissaries had constituted the most powerful, certainly the most militarily potent, obstacle to reform. With the Corps

abolished Mahmud could now proceed with his reforming schemes without needing to go in fear of losing either his throne or his life.

Thus it was that at the end of 1826 a code of regulation was prepared for the formation of a new-style army.[64] The force was to consist of twelve thousand men stationed in the capital with additional troops in the provinces.[65] Each man was to serve for a period of twelve years.[66] Mahmud and his advisers were greatly encouraged to move in the direction of Westernizing and modernizing the armed forces by the striking success achieved by Muhammed Ali of Egypt in similar reforms.[67] It was, thus, to Egypt that Mahmud turned with a request for twelve expert instructors to help in the modernization drive.[68] The request was turned down.[69] Thus Mahmud was forced to turn to Europe for assistance.[70] But the Sultan would not turn to France for help on account of their support for Muhammed Ali in Egypt and their earlier sympathy with Greek insurgents.[71] An offer of help came from Palmerston in England but was turned down on account of English philhellenism.[72] In 1835, however, some Turkish cadets were accepted for training at Woolwich and three british officers went to Istanbul to assist with the military reforms.[73] This was followed, in 1838, by a British naval mission to Istanbul.[74] Both missions met with little success, however, at least partly due to the growth of Russian influence in Istanbul.[75]

Beginning in 1827 Mahmud regularly sent groups of students to Europe.[76] At first these groups were made up exclusively of army and naval cadets, but in later

years civilian students were also included in the parties.[77] Mahmud persisted with this policy, despite the fact that it created a certain amount of opposition among ruling circles in the capital.[78]

In 1835 the Sultan engaged the services of von Moltke, a Prussian, who was to help in training the new army.[79] Following this appointment Prussian and Austrian help was sought in training the army.[80] The Sultan discovered that assistance from these quarters was readily available.[81] From this time on there was a growing tradition of Prussian advisers and instructors in the Ottoman army which culminated in the Empire's involvement in the First World War. But even though the soldiers of the new army were now being trained, with European help, the army still suffered from one chronic shortage. Apart from the presence of a number of Western renegades, the army was pitifully short of competent officers.[82] Indeed, in part the Ottoman army was to remain dependent upon Prussian officers for the remainder of the Empire's history.

Mahmud's other major military reforms consisted in establishing a number of schools. In 1827 a Medical School was founded exclusively to train Doctors for the army.[83] Civilian Doctors, meanwhile, continued to be trained in the Medical Departments of tratitional Medreses.[84] In the new Medical School instruction was in Turkish and French with several of the instructors being brought from Europe.[85]

In 1831-4 two other schools were opened for the purpose of instructing military personnel.[86] The first

of these was an Imperial Music School to train trumpeters and drummers for the new army,[87] and the second was a School of Military Sciences.[88] Europeans played a large part in the teaching of both these schools and the knowledge of one European language, most often French, was compulsory for all students.[89]

In 1843, came the last major military reform of the Ottoman period.[90] At this time, during the reign of Abdulmecid I (1838-1861), the army was reorganized into five army corps.[91] Each man was to serve for five years with the regular troops, followed by a further seven years in the reserve forces.[92] By this time all aspects of training, equipment, weapons and organization were firmly based on European models.[93] All that is except head-wear. Ottoman troops were now wearing the fez, which had been introduced from North Africa in 1828 on the orders of Sultan Mahmud II.[94] We shall look at the fez in more detail in a later section when we consider the so-called Hat Reform introduced by Ataturk.

The fez apart, it is also important to remember that simply dressing the ordinary soldiers in European style uniforms was a considerable step in a secularizing direction. In order to explain this statement, which may appear an exaggeration to a non-Muslim reader it will be necessary to explain briefly, the doctrine of Bid'a.

Bid'a is basically innovation. More fully, it means: "some view, thing or mode of action the like of which has not formerly existed or been practised, an innovation or novelty".[95] In the religious vocabulary

of some people Bid'a acquired "pejorative connotations - equivalent almost to heresy".[96] For this group all innovations, all departures from the customs of the Prophet's time were to be considered sinful.[97] Others, on the other hand, were prepared to accept that certain innovations, so long as they did not actually contradict the customs of the Prophet, and the teachings of the Qur'an and Hadith (tradi ions), could actually be beneficial.[98] The jurist al-Shafi'i contends that Bid'a may be either good or bad.[99] The bench-mark for distinguishing between the two is to consider whether or not they contradict the Qur'an and the traditions.[100] It is against the background of this doctrine that the often small changes occurring in Turkish life, in the present case army life, must be measured.

By the time the Ottoman military reforms had been completed there had been many such innovations and the Muslim soldiers were dressed in European uniforms, carrying European equipment and fighting with Western weapons. Even though these may not have been seen by some as innovations contradicting tradition, there was one further consideration mitigating against their eager acceptance by the troops. These new clothes and weapons were those of the hated Western infidel: people whose ways, particularly in battle, had so often been seen as antagonistic towards Islam, even if their uniforms did not contradict it. The Sultan's new style army had adopted infidel ways in order to fight for territory and the State: whereas previously it had rejected infidel ways,

and fought for Islam.

So we see that the military reforms both paved the way for secularizing measures by destroying the traditional conservative power-base of the Janissary corps and also began the process by Westernizing the armed forces.

19th Century Reforms:

We may now turn our attention to various reforms which took place in the nineteenth century outside the purely military sphere. We shall come in a little while to the group of reforms known as the Tanzimat, but first we must look at the reign of Mahmud II which immediately preceded the Tanzimat period.

Sultan Mahmud II, sometimes referred to as the Peter the Great of the Ottoman Empire, was born in July 1784,[101] the son of Abdulhamid I.[102] He appears to have been greatly influenced by Selim III, his cousin, and like other Ottoman rulers before him, knew no Western languages.[103]

Mahmud's great aim was to centralise the administration of the Empire by bringing the provinces under the direct and effective control of the government in Istanbul.[104] In this he was largely successful.[105] He certainly succeeded in establishing his personal and direct control over both Rumelia and Anatolia.[106] To achieve this required, essentially, the elimination of all intermediate sources of authority and power.[107] All power which derived from inheritance, tradition, custom or even popular assent was to be suppressed leaving the Sultan as the only source of legitimate authority in the Empire.[108] Clearly, the

suppression of the Janissary corps was an element in this policy. On the whole it is this centralizing element which dominates the reforms of Mahmud's reign. His reforms represent an essential clearing of the ground prior to the attempts at erecting new structures which was made following his death.

In 1838, Mahmud took limited steps in the direction of reforming education.[109] Two new grammar schools were established in mosques in Istanbul, the purpose of which was to prepare boys, up to the age of about eighteen, for entry into the civil service.[110] Although the establishment of the schools was an innovation there was nothing very novel about their syllabuses. In fact the syllabuses were remarkably traditional with the main emphasis being gramatical and literary.[111] The schools, thus, could do nothing to help with the chronic shortage of Muslim Turks with an adequate knowledge of some Western language.[112] Most of the translation work which was needed in the Empire had to be done by members of local Jewish and Christian minorities.[113] Yet this situation came to be seen as unsatisfactory, particularly as the ruling elite in the Empire came to believe that the loyalty of their non-Muslim subjects was not always to be trusted.[114] Muslim Turks with a knowledge of European languages were needed to learn, and subsequently to teach Western sciences.[115] Along with this a new Turkish vocabulary would need to be created to refer to the things and concepts which were being imported from the West.[116] Despite the urgency of the need, however, no significant improvement was to be made

in the situation for some time.

A centralized authority and administration for the Empire would clearly increase the burden to be carried by Mahmud's civil servants, both in the capital and in the localities. In order to ensure that the new system of centralized government worked satisfactorily, Mahmud attempted to raise both the status of his civil servants and their standards of proficiency and honesty.[117] Clearly, the two schools mentioned above were aimed at improving the proficiency of civil servants in the long term. However, in June 1826, more immediate steps were taken.[118] Mahmud extended the right to bequeath property to civil servants: previously they had no right to dispose of their estates to a next of kin upon their death.[119] At the same time this measure eroded a traditional privilege of the ulema, who up until this time had been the only members of the ruling askeri class who had the right to bequeath their property.[120] This measure did, then, extend to civil servants a measure of security for their lives and their property which they had not enjoyed hitherto.[121]

1831 saw the first Ottoman census of modern times.[122] The census was limited in scope, surveying only the male populations of Rumelia and Anatolia.[123] The reason for these limits is to be found in the purpose for which the information collected was to be used, for assessing conscription and taxation.[124] It is interesting to note, however, that, in an attempt to alleviate popular fears and suspicions of this move, certain members of the ulema

were included among the census takers.[125] Also at this time, a land survey was carried out to facilitate a more efficient system of assessment and collection for taxes.[126]

In the same year a step was taken towards the abolition of feudalism when the Timar system was abolished.[127] A Timar was a piece of land which was held by a Sipahi, a cavalryman, in return for military service.[128] This measure had two effects. Firstly, it did away with a form of military service which had become inefficient and unreliable. Secondly, it assisted in the centralization of authority by eliminating Timar tenants who had often become powerful figures in the provinces.[129]

In 1826 Mahmud incorporated the administration of all pious foundations and their revenues in a new Directorate, later to become a Ministry, of Evkaf.[130] Evkaf, in Arabic Wakf (or Waqf), is a pious foundation, usually in the form of land, the revenues of which are assigned to specific, religious purposes.[131] By this move the collection and expenditure of all such funds was concentrated in the hands of the Sultan.[132] This move was far more dangerous and controversial than the others which have been mentioned.[133] Perhaps one of the most significant effects of this measure, however, was to deprive the ulema of a measure of independence. We shall return to this aspect of the reform in a little while.

In 1831 the Turkish official gazette (Takvim-i Vekayi) began publication.[134] This event aided the process of centralization by explaining the policies of the Sultan to his civil servants for whom the gazette

came to be required reading. An additional contribution to the centralization of all power in the hands of the Sultan came in 1834 with the inauguration of an official postal system.[135] The appearance of the first telegraph in 1855, and the first railway in the following year also increased the effectiveness of centralization.[136]

The importance of such centralizing measures as have been discussed can best be appreciated by realising that the power-bases of various groups which might oppose reforms was being gradually eliminated. The conservative and traditionalist Janissary corps was gone, the ulema had lost their financial independence to a large degree, and local officials and nobles in the provinces had been brought more firmly under the control of the central administration. This meant, in effect, that a reform minded Sultan was in a far better position now to impose his desires on the Empire than had previously been the case. The other major trend, connected with centralization, which contributed to giving future Sultans more of a free hand was the bureaucratization of the ulema. This may be simply illustrated by looking at the position of the Chief Mufti of Istanbul, the leading member of the ulema class in the entire empire. Prior to the destruction of the Janissary corps this official had appointed his own secretaries and assistants and transacted all his business from his own home.[137] Following the abolition of the Janissaries, however, the Sultan gave the Chief Mufti the building previously occupied by the Aga of the Janissaries as his official residence.[138] To assist the Mufti in his new official residence a

department of the Chief Mufti was created whose secretaries were appointed on the approval of the Sultan.[139] The consequence of such a bureaucratization of the ulema is well stated by Lewis. He tells us that it:

> undermined their popular and effective power and greatly weakened their ability - and at times even their desire - to resist change.[140]

Changes were also being made in the social life of the upper echelon in the capital. From 1829, for example, the Sultan began hosting Western-style receptions.[141] The arrangements for these events included the use of European furniture and the Sultan went so far as to show deference to any ladies present.[142] One must not be tempted to under-estimate the difference which European furniture made. New forms of furniture can change not only the appearance of a room, but also the way in which people sit, eat and act in it. As Laroui puts it:

> It is true that it was not the Decembrists or the Savants accompanying Bonaparte's expeditions who overturned societies, whether Russian or Egyptian, but English furniture.[143]

It is, however, equally important that the reform measures initiated by Mahmud should not be over-estimated. While these measures were an essential step in clearing the ground for what was to follow they did not go very deep. The law of Islam was still, substantially, unchallenged.[144] Certainly in questions of marriage and divorce, the family and inheritance Islamic laws and customs were still dominant.[145] Equally the status of women and of slaves remained unchanged.[146]

The obstacles faced by Mahmud, however, were considerable. He had to overcome the profound and well established contempt of Muslims for the infidels and for anything which had an infidel origin.[147] This view prevented Mahmud from enlisting the aid of any but a few Westerners in his efforts and meant that only limited use could be made of those whose assistance was engaged.[148] Nevertheless a start had been made. Mahmud was unable to build on the ground which he had cleared of its most dangerous traditionalist obstacles, owing to his death in 1839.

On the death of Mahmud II his son became Sultan Abdulmecid I.[149] Abdulmecid was determined to continue the reforming work of his father and was greatly encouraged in this by his mother, the Valide Sultan Bezm-i Alem.[150]

No time was wasted. On the third of November, 1839, Abdulmecid's ministers produced the Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber (Hatt-i Serif of Gulhane), which is generally regarded as the first reform of the Tanzimat period.[151] Among other things this document proclaimed security of life, honour and property for all subjects, the abolition of the system of tax farming, regularly and orderly recruitment into the armed forces, fair and public trials for criminal offences, and equality of all citizens before the law regardless of their religion.[152]

It was this last element which represented the greatest departure from standard Islamic custom and was, thus, the most shocking and disconcerting to Muslims.[153] It is true that both the traditions of Islam and the

policy of the Ottoman Empire granted a large amount of autonomy to non-Muslims in the organization of their own affairs and were, on the whole, fairly tolerant towards them.[154] Yet it is equally true that this tolerance rested on the assumption that the "tolerated communities were separate and inferior and were moreover clearly marked as such".[155] During Islamic conquests, on the whole, Christians and Jews were not encouraged to convert to Islam in any large degree.[156] To an extent this may well have been because the economic status of the Arab Muslims depended upon the subject peoples retaining their former religion and paying the poll tax.[157] In addition to paying the poll tax the non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim government had to distinguish themselves from Muslims by not riding on horseback or carrying weapons, and by having a generally respectful attitude towards Muslims.[158] The non-Muslim was also at certain legal disadvantages with regard to protection under criminal law, testimony in law-courts and marriage.[159] Yet more explicit expression was given to the inferior status of non-Muslims in A.H. 100 (717/718 A.D.) when the weregild for a Christian was fixed at half that for a Muslim.[160] Thus it is not surprising to find that at the time of the Rescript many Muslims simply accepted that although Jews and Christians must be tolerated, they must also be regarded as second-class citizens. This view is well encapsulated by Lewis: the "imfidel and the true believer were different and separate; to equalize them and to mix them was an offence against both religion and common sense".[161] It would require a great effort for

Muslims to give up this principle of inequality and separation.[162] At the very least the Noble Rescript, thus, declared the intention to partially secularize the legal system by removing from it any element of discrimination in favour of Islam and of Muslims.

Another interesting feature of the Noble Rescript is that it openly refers to the measures proposed as "new laws" and "new institutions".[163] From what was said above concerning the doctrine of Bid'a the significance of these references will be readily understood. If there remains any doubt, however, as to the importance of even minor changes there is a saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad which can surely shed some light on the significance of the claim that the Noble Rescript intended creating new institutions. According to the tradition Muhammad said: "the worst things are those that are novelties, all novelty is an innovation, every innovation is an error, and every error leads to Hell-Fire".[164] Despite traditions such as this, then, the Noble Rescript proclaimed the intention of the Sultan and most of his senior officials to create new institutions, rather than simply to pretend, as had happened in the past, that what appeared an innovation was simply a reversion to a previous custom or institution which had fallen into disuse.[165]

One of the "new institutions" which the Noble Rescript established was the Council of Judicial Ordinances (Meclis-i Ahkam-i Adliye), sometimes also referred to as the Council of Justice.[166] A body bearing this name had earlier been established by Mahmud II in

1837.[167] In the Noble Rescript this body was given a "supervisory and quasi-legislative" function.[168] This served to place in readiness the administrative apparatus that would be used shortly when various legal codes began to be introduced into the Ottoman legal system.

In March, 1840, a completely new form of centralized provincial administration was introduced.[169] Like many other introductions into Turkey in the Nineteenth Century this was based on a French model.[170] In place of the earlier system of tax-farmers and semi-feudal dignitaries the new system placed the districts under the control of salaried officials.[171] This system would serve to centralize power in the hands of the Sultan and, at the same time, to bring to an end the old feudal system which still held sway in some areas. But it was also yet another innovation, and, further, an innovation copying an infidel system. However, this was something of an ambitious project and it was a little while before it could be fully put into effect over a wide area.[172]

According to the strict theory developed over the years by Muslim jurists, there could be no legislative authority in a State as all law came from God and was promulgated in the form of divine revelation.[173] However, strict theories often find it necessary, or merely expedient to compromise with events and this theory was to be no exception. In earlier Islamic Empires the jurists had recognised both custom and the will of the ruler as legally valid and effective.[174] These elements were applied in administrative tribunals which were

outside the system of courts administering the Holy Law.[175] Certainly the Ottoman Sultans issued Kanuns, but it would be a mistake to regard these as laws. Rather, a Kanun is "a codification of existing law - a tabulation of legal rules".[176] In fact the Ottomans went further than previous Muslim regimes had done in establishing the authority of Islamic Law.[177] However, major departures from this tradition began in the mid-Nineteenth Century. In 1840 a new Penal Code was introduced.[178] The provisions of the Code were influenced by French law but were "mainly within the framework of the penal law of the Seriat".[179] However the code did affirm the equality of all subjects before the law.[180] Here, for the first time, albeit tentatively, we see the appearance of a legislative body and the regulative principle in the Ottoman State.[181] The ulema offered no resistance to the new Code.[182]

In 1846 a Council of Public Instruction was created which, in 1847, became a Ministry.[183] Although the plans for this new body were ambitious, by 1850 only six new secondary schools had been established.[184] Taken together the new schools only had 870 pupils.[185] In establishing the schools the Sultan and his officials were careful to pay lip-service to the important place of Islam in education.[186] In spite of this, however, it was this reform which paved the way for secular education, for the effect of the reform was to create new schools whose teachers and curricula were outside of the control of the ulema.[187]

So far the reformers had not felt sufficiently sure

of themselves to establish any system of courts or any legal system not almost entirely based upon the religious law of Islam.[188] In 1847, however, mixed civil and criminal courts were established with European and Ottoman judges sitting in equal numbers.[189] The rules of evidence and the procedural rules for these courts were drawn from European rather than from Islamic sources.[190]

Other developments were taking place which served to bring Turkey closer to the major European powers in the field of legislation. In 1840 Commercial Boards were given official recognition.[191] The task of these boards was to adjudicate cases between Turkish and foreign traders by applying European customs and practices.[192] In 1850 a Commercial Code was adopted and enacted; the first secular code in Turkey.[193] This code had been prepared for introduction in 1841, but due to opposition from the ulema its promulgation at that time had been abandoned.[194] This code was based on the French Commercial Code of 1807,[195] and was administered by Commercial tribunals totally independent of the ulema.[196] This code, indeed, was the "harbinger of a complete legal and social revolution".[197] It was followed by an additional Commercial Code, also adopted from the French, in 1860.[198] This code, together with the Maritime Commercial Code of 1864,[199] was administered by the Commercial Courts which were responsible to the Ministry of Commerce.[200] In turn, the working of these courts was regulated by the Code of Procedure of Commercial Courts, introduced in 1861.[201] All of these measures

were adopted from the West for pragmatic reasons stemming from the pressures of the world economic system.[202]

Such developments however were not only to be found in the Commercial sector. In 1858 a new Penal Code was published which was adopted and modified from the French Penal Code.[203] Although based on the French model the new Penal Code did have "several significant omissions, additions, and amendations".[204] However, the new Penal Code did abolish the traditional hadd, defined punishments, of Islamic law: all that is but the death penalty for apostasy.[205] To administer the Penal Code Criminal Courts began to be established alongside the traditional religious courts.[206] Yet the shift to Western Legal Codes was not wholesale by any means. For in the same year as the adoption of the new Penal Code, a land law was adopted which was "prepared with due concern for national practices and needs".[207]

The adoption of Western based Legal Codes was, of course, as much a measure of secularization as one of Westernization. The adoption of these Codes necessarily required, at least in part, the abandoning of the religious law of Islam.

On the 7th of May, 1855, a Ferman was issued to abolish two elements of discrimination against non-Muslims which were mentioned above.[208] The Poll tax was abolished, and the prohibition against non-Muslims bearing arms was lifted throwing military service open to all citizens.[209] However, after being disqualified from military service many members of the minority communities

were either unsuited, or simply disinclined to serve in the armed forces.[210] Those who exempted themselves from military service were obliged to pay a special exemption tax (the bedel) which was levied in exactly the same way as the Poll tax had been.[211] Thus for many in the minority communities the effect of the two measures taken together was to leave the situation exactly as it had been before.

On the 18th of February, 1856, a new reform charter was promulgated by the Sultan: the Imperial Rescript (Hatt-i Humayun).[212] This reaffirmed the principles set out in the Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber of 1839.[213] Tax farming was abolished yet again, as was discrimination against subjects on religious grounds.[214]

On June 20th, 1861, Abdulmecid died and was succeeded by his brother Abdulaziz.[215] Abdulaziz was not an easy individual with whom to work, being "capricious and violent, obstinate and irascible".[216] Unlike his brother, Abdulaziz was not at all in sympathy with the reformers.[217] Despite this, however, the reform movement had by now gained sufficient momentum to be able to continue its work for some time longer.

In 1868 the Imperial Ottoman Lycee was opened in Galatasaray.[218] This was a major event in the progress towards secular education. It was, in fact, the first attempt made with any seriousness by a Muslim government to provide, at the secondary level, a modern education im a Western language.[219] As might be expected following the precedent of previous reforms the language in which instruction was provided at the school was French.[220] Another notable feature of the school was that here,

for the first time, Muslim and Christian pupils were taught side by side.[221] The importance of the school went far beyond the fact that it provided this mixed teaching in an attempt to move towards religious de-segregation. As Turkey's need for officials with a Western education grew, so graduates of the Imperial Ottoman Lycee came to play an increasingly important part in the development and administration of the Ottoman Empire and, later, of the Turkish Republic.[222] The Imperial Ottoman Lycee, Lewis tells us, "had no playing-fields, but not a few of the victories of modern Turkey were won in its classrooms".[223]

The first important innovation in the sphere of Civil Law occurred in 1869. In that year the Civic Code began to appear, and would continue to be published in instalments until 1876.[224] This Code simply codified the existing religious law "instead of trying to solve each legal problem by means of Fetvas."[225] Despite still being based on the religious law this measure was an important innovation as it was modern, that is Western, in both form and presentation.[226] This meant, in fact that these law books could be used even by those who lacked the training in jurisprudence which was the traditional monopoly of the ulema. This Code, which followed the Hanafi school of Islamic law remained in force until the early years of the Republic when it was abrogated in 1926.[227]

In 1871 events taking place far from the Ottoman borders posed a serious threat to the reform movement within the Empire. This threat was to prove fatal, and

to usher in a period when no significant moves in a Westernizing or secularizing direction took place. The event concerned was the Franco-Prussian War and the French defeat. This defeat lowered the prestige of France within the ruling circles in the Ottoman Empire and therefore, as so many of the reforms had been based on French models, the prestige of the reforms also [illegible] received a considerable blow.[228] Had the occupant of the Ottoman throne at this time had sympathy with the reform movement, the reformers might have managed to ride out this storm. But, as the Sultan had little or no sympathy with the reforming process, the result of the Franco-Prussian War with the evidence of French fallibility it provided, proved to be an insuperable obstacle for the reformers to overcome. At this point a determined mood of reaction took hold of the Ottoman State.[229] Ottoman Christians were dismissed from public service and much greater stress was laid on the Islamic character of the Ottoman State and on Islamic unity, rather than Westernization, became the guiding light in the Empire.[230]

Despite the reaction, however, the reform movement was merely stopped in its tracks. The reforms had, by this time, gone too far for it to be easily possible for the Empire to revert to the situation which prevailed prior to the beginning of the reform movement. A great deal had been achieved. As Lewis puts it:

> The men of the Tanzimat, with all their failings, laid the indispensible foundation for the more thorough modernization that was to follow.[231]

By the mid-Nineteenth Century, on the whole, secularization

had moved so far in Western Europe that to westernize the Ottoman system meant, almost inevitably, that the system would be secularized at the same time.

Mention has been made, above, of the declining power of the ulema to resist change in the Nineteenth Century. Perhaps it would be useful, before turning to reforms in the early years of the present century to gather together some comments on this subject.

The Decline Of The Power Of The Ulema:

In the context of the Ottoman Empire, the term Ulema was applied to those individuals who had, as Chambers explains:

> secured appointment as mosque functionaries, teachers, jurisconsults, or judges. They were members of the learned or religious professions holding patents of office, ranks, and titles peculiar to their career.[232]

In Ottoman society the ulema constituted a group with exceptional power and privileges.[233] The most materially significant of their privileges was the fact that their property, unlike that of civil servants before the time of Mahmud II, was not subject to confiscation on their deaths.[234] As a group, the ulema had reached the height of their power by the middle of the Eighteentn Century.[235]

After this the ulema, as a class, went into a decline. It must be emphasised, however, that this decline was gradual and the ulema remained an element whose wishes had to be taken into account by the high officials of the Empire. One of the major causes of the decline of the ulema in the early period was the

increasing competition within the group caused by more and more ulema seeking the limited number of top religious posts.[236] The corruption and nepotism which this competition brought about resulted in a "widespread decay in moral fibre and quality of learning".[237] These forces eventually took their toll. The privileges of the ulema made it an attractive source of prestige and power with the result that there was considerable pressure from the descendants of nobles, soldiers and public servants to enter the ulema class. Indeed, some of these aspirants actually bought the diplomas which qualified them as ulema meaning that there arose a group among the ulema who held posts as ulema without having received the education which their diplomas claimed they had completed.[238] With such forces as these working from within the group it is little wonder that by the end of the Eighteenth Century the ulema were beginning to show signs of weakness.[239] In the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II it became clear that although the ulema were still a force to be reckoned with they were much too divided and compromised to be able to offer any kind of sustained and telling resistance tootwo such reform minded Sultans.[240]

Despite these developments, in the early Nineteenth Century the ulema still maintained a monopolistic control over education and the law.[241] Other measures which have already been mentioned, however, served to further weaken the position of the ulema. The destruction of the Janissary Corps in 1826 by Mahmud II deprived the ulema of a similarly conservative military ally.[242] Following this Mahmud gave the Chief Mufti an official

residence, as discussed above, which effectively infringed the traditional administrative independence of the ulema.[243] Also under Mahmud II the ulema lost their financial independence when the Sultan established control over evkaf revenues (the pious foundations).[244] Indeed, it is a pointed illustration of the divided nature of the ulema that certain of their number actually supported some of the Westernizing reforms.[245] On the whole this can be put down to a lack of foresight on the part of these individuals. The leading ulema who supported reforms in the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II, Heyd concludes, were not sufficiently "farsighted to realize that the Westernizing reforms supported by them would eventually destroy the Islamic character of the Ottoman State and society".[246]

Later in the Nineteenth Century, during the Tanzimat period, the ulema lost ground on all fronts.[247] They reacted negatively and defensively to the secularizing tendencies of the reformers.[248] However by this time the major damage to their powerful position had been done. For the remainder of the Nineteenth Century and the years immediately following 1900, as mentioned earlier, although they remained influential in localities, particularly in the rural areas, they had ceased to have a great deal of power at the centre of the Empire. This marginalization of the ulema, as mentioned in the previous section, greatly influenced and lessened the effectiveness of the contributions they could make to the debate concerning the future direction to be taken by the Empire.

The Millet System:

One form of separation of temporal and spiritual power may be thought to have existed for a long time in the Ottoman State, in the form of the Millet system. Yet it would not be at all accurate to see this system as a form of separation of religious and political or civil authority. In an attempt to clear up what could be a misunderstanding here, the following is a brief note on the Millet system in order that we may appreciate its true nature.

The Millet system was not an innovation of the Ottoman rulers, but on the Conquest of Constantinople in 1453 Muhammed the Conqueror merely allowed the existing system to continue to function.[249] Shortly after entering the city Muhammed the Conqueror - Mehmed II (1451-1481) - recognised the recently elected Greek Orthodox Patriarch Genadius.[250] His duty was to represent the Greek community in its dealings with the Ottoman State.[251] In addition, Genadius was granted judicial authority to settle all cases concerning the internal affairs of his community including such matters as marriage, divorce and inheritance.[252] An Armenian Patriarchate with similar functions and rights was recognised by the Sultan in 1461.[253]

By the early part of the Nineteenth Century there had been a considerable growth in the number os Millets recognised by the Ottoman government. In this period the following Millets functioned in the ways outlined above: the Greek Orthodox, Greek Melkite, Maronite, Gregorian Armenian, Catholic Armenian, Syrian Jacobite,

Orthodox Coptic, Orthodox Chaldean, Catholic Chaldean, and Jewish.[254] In 1850 this list was lengthened still further with the addition of the Evangelical Church of Armenia.[255]

The system guaranteed the individual communities freedom from interferance in their affairs, at the same time as prohibiting them from interfering in the affairs of the other communities.[256] Thus the system effectively precluded the emergence of any marked degree of evangelical or proselytising effort by any of the groups.[257] Theoretically speaking, "a Christian, a Jew, and a Muslim, living in the same house were subject to separate laws, each according to his Millet".[258] though it must be said that such a house would probably prove difficult to find in actuality.

Though our consideration of the system has been brief it is hoped that sufficient has been said to make it clear that this was not a system for separating religious and secular spheres. The head of each community had control and charge not only of religious matters, but also of matters of law relating to the family and inheritance, which today would be considered secular.

1924 Constitution:

On 26th April, 1924, following the War of Independence, a new Constitution was accepted for Turkey.[259] In their work in preparing the new Constitution the Constitutional Commission adapted some provisions from the Constitutions of France and Poland, but did not merely borrow any articles from other Constitutions.[260]

This Constitution declared Turkey to be a Republic[261] and stated that the religion of the state was Islam (Art. 2).[262] Thus the existing position of Islam was reaffirmed at the same time as the changed political situation was formulated in legal terms.

Yet Islam was not to remain unaffected by the changing situation. This was recognised constitutionally in 1928. On 10th April of that year the 1924 Constitution was amended.[263] Article 2 of the Constitution was amended deleting the statement that Islam was the state religion of the Republic.[264] Commenting on this change Cragg declares that at this point "laicisation and secularity became complete".[265] Yet this judgement is a little premature. For the completion of the process of secularism we must look to the latter part of the following decade.

On 5th February, 1937 the Constitution of 1924 was amended yet again.[266] On this occasion Article 2 was amended to the effect that Turkey was a "laic" Republic.[267] It is only at this late stage that the secularization process was made constitutionally explicit. It seems likely that this late declaration does not reflect an actual change or development in Ataturk's plans. It rather reflects, I believe, a tactical move by Ataturk to refrain from making his plans too explicit in the early years of the Republic until other reforms had succeeded in reducing the influence of religious leaders to some extent.

Article 12 of the Constitution, as issued in 1924,

stated that "those unable to read and write Turkish" were ineligible to stand for election to the Grand National Assembly.[268] This emphasised the essential Turkishness of the state.

Article 75 dealt specifically with religion, condemning religious discrimination and allowing for freedom of worship. The final form of this Article read:

> No one may be censured for the philosophical creed, religion or doctrine to which he may adhere. All religious services not in contravention of public order and morals and the laws are authorized.[269]

This, however, represents the reworded form of this Article which was passed on 5th January, 1937.[270] This rewording was found necessary because the original Article, due to an oversight, guaranteed freedom of "religion, doctrine, tarikat," and philosophical belief.[271] This change in wording can only be due to an error in the earlier version as the Tarikats (Dervish Orders) were abolished by a decree issued by the Cabinet on 20th September, 1925. In view of this move, which shall be discussed in more detail later, it was clearly anomalous for the Constitution to guarantee freedom of tarikat until 1937.

Article 88, in the Draft Constitution, read as follows: "The people of Turkey, regardless of religion and race, are Turks".[272] But the Article, in this form, was objected to by Hamdullah Suphi, Deputy for Istanbul.[273] Talking about Armenian and Jewish minorities he called on them to:

> Accept Turkish culture. Then we shall call

> you Turks. But you maintain a separate language, separate schools and aim at a separate state; and then you come to us and tell us that you want to be considered a Turk... The Article...if it passes stating that they are Turks, they could use this against us.[274]

Because of this objection the Article was amended so that the final version stated that: "The people of Turkey, regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards citizenship".[275]

Thus it can be seen that the Constitution of 1924 guaranteed freedom of religion and stated that citizenship was not dependent upon holding to any particular religious tradition. Later Constitutions, of 1961 and 1982, found it necessary to say a good deal more on the subject of religion. But the freedom of religion, within certain limits, and the equality of citizens regardless of religion were to reappear consistantly in the Constitutions of the Turkish Republic.

1926 Civil Code:

The Civil Code of 1926 represents a most important breakthrough. It was considered and passed by the Grand National Assembly.[276] Although some questions concerning pious foundations were still governed by Islamic law,[277] the new Civil Code was based on the Swiss Civil Code,[278] which was framed in 1912 from the existing Germanic Civil Code.[279] This Germanic Civil Code was codified in 1874-96, and also formed the basis for the Chinese and Japanese Civil Codes.[280]

It would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of this development. As we have seen, Commercial Codes

had been introduced into Turkey from the West prior to this, and measures had also been taken to remove certain areas of administrative law from the jurisdiction of the religious law of Islam. But, as Lewis explains: "this was the first time that a reformer had dared to invade the intimacies of family and religious life, the inviolate preserve of...Holy Law".[281] With the introduction by the Grand National Assembly of the new Civil Code the Holy Law was repealed and declared null and void.[282] Polygamy and the traditional Islamic restrictions on the freedom and status of women were abolished.[283] The marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man now became legally possible.[284] Marriage was valid only when registered with the relevant civil authorities and all adults were regarded as having the right to change their religion whenever they wished.[285]

The application of the new Code was not uniform. In major towns and cities the new regulations governing marriage, divorce and inheritance were largely enforced.[286] In smaller and remoter settlements, on the other hand, the picture was quite different. To ensure the legitimacy of children, it is true, marriages were almost uniformly registered with the Civil authorities.[287] After one marriage had been registered, however:

> The 'legal' wife was then credited with the offspring of other wives, bound to their husbands by the bonds of religion and custom, though without the consecration of the secular state.[288]

The fact that the new Civil Code was not instantly applied uniformly from Istanbul to the smallest village in the

Eastern provinces, need not cause us to doubt the importance of the Code. Such a major set of changes would be bound to take time to work their way down to the villages. As Lewis puts it, the introduction of the Civil Code did not "transform Turkey overnight into a Middle Eastern Switzerland".[289]

Despite this, the Code was an extremely important development in Turkey. In fact, it has been claimed that this "Code signified the unmitigated secularization of civil life".[290] It is most important in assessing the significance of the Code to realise that it was instituted from above in Turkey, rather than growing up from below. The aim of those promoting the Code was to shape the relations of the people rather than to regulate the behaviour of the nation according to existing customs and religious norms.[291] Development from above, not below.

The Code must be seen against the background of secularization in an Islamic context. Law has, throughout history, been central to Islam and the main Islamic discipline has been jurisprudence rather than theology. As Berkes points out:

> If the crux of Western secularism lay in the relations between state and church, the pivot of secularization in Muslim societies lay in the secularization of law, particularly the civil law.[292]

Seen against this background the truly great significance of the new Civil Code may be properly appreciated.

1926 Penal Code:

In addition to the Civil Code, 1926 also saw the

introduction of a new Penal Code.[293] It would be appropriate here to mention those Articles which were concerned with religious matters. Article 163, for example, condemns those who:

> by misuse of religion, religious sentiments or things that are religiously considered as holy, in any way incite the people to action prejudicial to the security of the state, or form associations for this purpose...Political associations on the basis of religion or religious sentiments may not be formed.[294]

The legislative attempt to exclude religion from the political process was continued in two later Articles of the Penal Code (241 and 242). These Articles gave punishments for any religious leaders who, whilst preaching or teaching their followers, brought the administrative acts and laws of the government into disrepute or incited their followers to disobey the government or its regulations.[295] The attempt to free politics and government from religious interferance has been a consistent feature of legislation throughout the history of the Republic. Yet such legislation has not prevented political parties from using religious sentiments in order to win votes, as we shall see later. Nor has it meant that in return for religion leaving the government alone that the government would not interfere in religious affairs. As Halide Edib has put it: "The Turks have at last rendered up the things that were Caesar's or the State's; but Caesar, or the State still keeps things which belong to God".[296]

As another element in the limiting and segregation of religion in public life the spatial limits of

religious worship were also laid down. Article 529 of the Penal Code stated punishments for religious leaders and functionaries who conduct religious celebrations or processions outside recognised places of worship.[297] Thus religion was to be thoroughly restricted. Not only was its operation limited to personal matters, rather than the wider field of social life, but it was also to be limited to functioning in certain buildings. Thus it can be seen how far, at least in legislative terms, the secularization of the Turkish Republic had progressed by 1926.

Abolition Of Sultanate And Caliphate:

The relationship between the Sultan-Caliph in Istanbul and the emerging nationalist movement in Ankara did not get off to a good start. During the national struggle, or War of Independence:

> Fetvas were issued to the effect that partisans of the government at Ankara were to be considered religious heretics...and death sentences were passed on the leaders of the National Struggle.[298]

The Sultan may have acted under pressure from the victorious Allies who had effective control of Istanbul, and Ataturk's mind regarding the future of the Sultanate-Caliphate may have been made up by this time. But the issuing of such Fetvas certainly could not have helped the two parties to establish a satisfactory working relationship.

Thus, in November 1922 the Sultanate and the Caliphate were separated,[299] and the Sultanate was abolished by a decision of the Grand National Assembly.[300] Sovereignty was thus transferred from the Sultan to the

nation.[301] Sultan Mehmed VI (reigned 1918-1922) left the country and his cousin Abdulmecid was elected Caliph, by the Grand National Assembly.[302]

Caliph, was the title given to the supreme head of the community of Muslims in his capacity as "successor and vicegerent of the Prophet".[303] Such was his authority that Sunni hadith (traditions) taught that anyone who rebelled against the Caliph rebelled against God.[304] The duties of the Caliph were generally held to be the defence of Islam, adjudication of legal disputes, the defence of the territorial integrity of Islamic rule, providing troops to guard the frontiers, collecting taxes, punishing wrongdoers, waging Holy War, and to take an active and personal interest in the details of government and administration.[305]

Abdulaziz (reigned 1861-1876) was keen to assert that the Sultan was not only the head of the Ottoman Empire but also the Caliph of all Muslims, no matter who their temporal ruler might be.[306] Due to the fact that at this time Muslim lands in North Africa and Asia were coming under increasing pressure or domination from Europe, this new idea rapidly won wide support.[307] The total effect of this move was that: "the Ottoman Caliphate provided a rallying point for the forces opposed to Westernization and the West".[308] This being the case, it is hardly surprising that the Caliphate was to come under attack from the reformers of the early Republic.

However, the position of the Caliphate had been

weakened by events which took place prior to the establishment of the Republic. The separatist tendencies of Muslim groups within the Ottoman Empire had shown that Islamic Internationalism was on the decline, to be replaced by nationalism among the Muslim groups.[309] In 1915 the Caliph in Istanbul proclaimed a Holy War, which was generally disregarded by the Arab Muslims within the Empire who tended to side with the Allies and against the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph.[310] In fact there is a considerable amount of truth in the assessment that the Arab choice to side with the Allies during the World War "weakened the value of the Caliphate",[311] and that had this not happened "it would have proved an almost impossible task to abolish the Caliphate in Turkey".[312]

When he became Caliph, Abdulmecid took his duties seriously.[313] But he also failed to adapt to the new situation: "he failed to make his office purely spiritual".[314] In addition to which the Ankara government became concerned that Abdulmecid's office could become a "rallying point for discontented religious conservatives".[315] Besides which the separation of the two offices represented a distinction between religious and secular power which most of the people of Turkey had not learned to make.[316] So it became necessary to abolish the Caliphate as well.[317]

The decision to abolish the Caliphate was taken by Ataturk while attending military manoeuvres in January and February of 1924: in this matter Ataturk acted only when he felt sure the army were behind him.[318] Traditionalists helped to prepare the way for the

abolition of the Caliphate by insisting that the Caliphate and the Sultanate were inseparable.[319] Doubtless they saw this as an argument for installing Abdulmecid as Sultan, but the new government in Ankara chose, rather, to see it as an argument for abolishing the Caliphate also. Thus, on 3rd March, 1924 the Grand National Assembly voted for the abolition of the Caliphate.[320] In addition, all members of the Ottoman dynasty were exiled.[321] This banishment order remained in force until it was rescinded in June 1952.[322] To complete the day the Ministries of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations were suppressed, and all Muslim religious schools were abolished creating a unified, and secular, school system.[323]

These measures opened the way for the abolition of Islamic law which, as we have seen, took place in 1926. For, as Berkes puts it:

> The abolition of the Caliphate implied the abolition of the <u>sheriat</u> as a law of the state because once the traditional temporal and political power had been rejected, its legal basis and structure was bound to fall too.[324]

In addition it may be remarked that this move also effectively removed from the scene the most likely figure-head of opposition to the new government in Ankara.

<u>Calendar, Time and Measurement:</u>

Prior to the Republican period in Turkey, in 1915, a law was debated in the House of Deputies proposing a change to the Gregorian Calendar.[325] The proposal was rejected but was passed in the following year.[326] The Muslim year of 354 days is purely lunar and thus

tended to be unsuitable for government and administrative purposes.[327] Thus, financial and administrative calendars were developed in the Muslim world based on Western models but taking their starting point as the Hijra. One such was the Ottoman financial year which used a Julian year combined with a Hijra era, and was introduced into Ottoman administration in 1789.[328] So the decision of 1916 was not a totally innovative one; but it was significant that, the new calendar was to be applied to all areas of life.

On January the first, 1926, this earlier change was altered still further. At this point the Christian era was introduced for calendars to replace the former practice of dating events from the Hijra.[329] This was a most significant step; the prophet Muhammed was no longer officially recognised as the starting point for a new era in world history.

In order to demonstrate the need for reform in the dating system to the unified system now reached, it will be valuable to look at a page from an Ottoman office calendar (reproduced on the next page).[330] The section on the right hand side, in French, tells us that this is the page of the calendar for Thursday, the 20th April.[331] It also indicates to us the date of the last quarter of the moon.[332]

This section also informs us that noon is at eleven minutes past five.[333] Below this, in addition to information concerning the rising and setting of the sun, we are told that 12 O'Clock (midnight) is, for the Turks



A LEAF FROM AN INDICATOR.

forty nine minutes past six.[334] This information is necessary as the Turks, in the Ottoman period, reckoned each day from sunset to sunset. Thus it was that on this particular day noon was at eleven minutes past five.[335] However, the hours of sunset differ throughout the year. Thus, Istanbul had a sunset at 7.36 p.m. on the 30th of June, with midnight and noon the following day both at 4.24 according to Turkish time.[336] However, on the 10th December, sunset was at 4.31 with midnight and noon both at 7.29.[337] Those making use of a steamer time-table in Istanbul, thus needed to remember that if a ship left at 4.30 p.m., the time-table would call this 8.54 in June and 12 0'Clock in December.[338] Things were further complicated for those on a journey with the fact that the railway, unlike the steamer, kept to European and not Turkish time.[339]

To the left of the French portion of the calendar is a section in Greek which also tells us that it is Thursday, but here it is the 7th of April and not the 20th.[340] This discrepancy is simply due to the difference between the Orthodox calendar and that generally used in Western Europe at this time.[341] In the horizontal section above the Greek and the French, the Bulgarizn is informed that it is Thursday the 7th of April, as it is for the Greek and also for the Armenian.[342]

In the small section below the Greek section, the Armenian is informed that it is a fast-day, Great Thursday.[343] In addition it is a double festival commemorating the Anunciation of the Holy Mother of Jesus,[344] along with the washing of the disciples' feet.[345] To

the Greek, who does not keep the Armenian fast-day, it is a festival commemorating the martyr Kalliopiou, while in the French section the Catholic is told that it is the feast of Saint Agnes.[346]

So far, in the French, Greek, Bulgarian and Armenian sections, the year has been 1911.[347] However, on reading the upper portion of the calendar the Turk would discover that it is 1329 in reckoning by the Hijra (to the right of the crescent), but it is 1327 if he reckons by the financial year (to the left of the crescent).[348] Also to the left of the crescent is printed the word Nisan, the name of the month, beneath which the large figure tells us that it is the 7th.[349] To the right of the crescent the name of the month is given as Rebi-ul-Akhir, with the date as the 21st.[350] In addition we are told that Nisan has 30 days, while Rebi-ul-Akhir contains only 29.[351] Both sides are agreed, however, that it is Thursday.[352]

In dealing with the Turkish peasant, on the other hand, one would need to know that it was the 164th day of Kasim (the small figures under the 21).[353] This is because the peasant reckons the year by dividing it into two seasons and then counting the days of each.[354] Kasim begins on the 8th of November, and is followed by Hidrelliz which begins on May 6th.[355] Thus we see that it is Kasim the 164th to the peasant, 21st day of Rebi-ul-Akhir 1329 to the ordinary town dweller, and the 7th of Nisan to the Government official who is living in 1327.[356]

At the bottom of the calendar the Jewish user is informed that it is Thursday the 22nd of Nisan, in the year 5671.[357]

This, surely, adequately demonstrates the need for reforming and standardising the method of reckoning the date. It must be considered too complicated to have, for this one Thursday, four dates for the year, four names for the month and five numberings for the day.[358]

Two other measures are noted here for the sake of completeness. Their importance lies in the fact that they symbolise Turkey's turn towards the West in a way which affected the whole society. Firstly, the international method of measuring time by reference to Greenwich mean Time was adopted.[359] Secondly, the Metric system of measurements was adopted;[360] as symbolic of Turkey's turn towards the West, as Britain's half-hearted metrication was symbolic of Britain's half-hearted turn towards Europe.

Day Of Rest:

The important day in the Islamic week is Friday. On this day the most important weekly prayers take place in the mosque. But, unlike the Christian Sunday, this day does not attract the civil restrictions to trading and work. There is no insistence in Islam that Friday should be a day of rest. In this Islam differs not only from the Christian Sunday, but also from the Jewish Sabbath.

Thus, in the Ottoman Empire, Friday was a day of prayer, not of rest. However it must not be assumed

that Ottoman officials worked a seven day week. From 1829 Sultan Mahmud II introduced a religiously neutral day of rest for government employees on Thursday.[360] This was changed on the fifth of January, 1924. On this day a law was enacted declaring Friday to be an official and compulsory day of rest for all Turkish businesses and citizens.[361] This gave the day a more than religious significance. This was a departure from tradition but was not a whole-hearted shift to the Sunday holiday common in Europe. In this way the government added the economic holiday to the already existing day of prayer and so created an Islamic model for the six-day working week which could stand against the European-Christian model.

The situation was again modified on the twenty-seventh of May, 1935.[362] The new situation declared in law no. 2739,[363] transferred the weekly commercial holiday from Friday to Sunday. The time delay between the two measures is no doubt significant; the move to the Sunday holiday being made only when the state felt sufficiently secure.

Thus a secular holiday was created in contrast with the weekly holy day on Friday. This secular holiday, being on a Sunday, fitted the European model. Symbolically, at least, therefore, this event has considerable significance.

Women:

Halide Edib tells us that it was Sultan Selim III who first expressed the opinion that unless the women of Turkey were enlightened about national ideals and given equality with men the Empire could not be saved.[364] Concern for the status of women grew until most "Turkish men of the progressive type...especially from 1908 on, have been in favour of the progress of women".[365]

Gokalp argued that the extent to which women were valued as mothers and wives meant that it was wrong for them to be discriminated against by the law.[366] For him it was impossible to build a strong and united nation without women having equal status with men. As he put it in one of his poems:

> If in inheritance our women are worth only
> half a man
> And in marriage only a quarter,
> Neither family nor nation can be uplifted.[367]

Ataturk, too, was convinced of the necessity of passing legislation to bring equality between the sexes in both family and public matters.[368] In Izmir in 1923, during a public speach, he stressed that he believed that Islam did not require women to be inferior to men.[369] Ataturk was keenly aware of the important part that the women of Anatolia had played in the war effort. As he expressed it at a meeting in Konya in 1923:

> Our women have always lived side by side with men. Not just today, but for generations our women shared equal responsibility, in war as in peace, in agriculture and in everyday life. Our men have fought bravely in defence of the country against invaders, but they had

> to be fed and supplied in the army. In this task they counted on the women. As our existence depends on women, so we seek their co-operation. In this war, as in previous ones, our high morale and driving force resulted from the work being shared by women. They plowed and sowed the fields, cut the wood, marketed their produce, kept the home fires burning, and, in every kind of weather, carried the ammunition needed by our troops in their carts or with their babies on their backs.[370]

As a reward for all this effort, he argued, men ought to be prepared, in the future:

> to have Turkish women as partners in everything, to share our lives with them, and to value them as friends, helpers, and colleagues in our scientific, spiritual, social, and economic life.[371]

After the Republic was founded such speeches were translated into action. A number of measures were taken which have greatly altered the position of women in Turkish society. The actual effect of these measures on women has varied according to their individual circumstances. There have always been differences in the treatment of women in different areas of the country, different strata of society and in different religious groups. Although the seclusion of women was a fact in the palace and among the upper classes it was not so widely practised elsewhere before the eighteenth century.[372] Alevi women, to give an example of a religious difference, have traditionally enjoyed greater freedom that Sunni women in Turkey.

Much of the impetus for the changes was provided, as we have seen from Ataturk's speech above, by the First

World War and the Turkish War of Independence or revolutionary struggle. These wars gave new opportunities for women to make a contribution in what used to be typically male areas of employment and activity. To this extent the position in Turkey is similar to that in much of Europe following the First and Second World Wars.

Though, as stated elsewhere, the wearing of the veil was never prohibited in Turkey,[373] nevertheless Feyzioglu feels he can make a very grand claim for the advancement of the position of women in Turkey. He states:

> Turkish women were granted the largest opportunities, at least as far as their legally granted rights were concerned, not only among women of all Islamic countries, but in the world in general.[374]

One of the most important measures to effect the status of women was the introduction of the Civil Code in 1926. The important provisions of this Code, such as the prohibition of polygamy and the institution of the civil marriage have already been mentioned. During the debate in the Grand National Assembly on the Civil Code, on 17th February 1926, Şukru Kaya a speaker for the justice commission,[375] made explicit the importance attached to such measures. He said:

> The new law incorporates such principles as monogamy and the right to divorce - principles which are required for a civilized nation.[376]

In 1930 a significant step was taken in the field of women's rights. In that year women were allowed both to vote in, and to stand for municipal elections.[377]

In 1934 women gained full political rights and duties.[378] The argument behind this latter change was set out in the introduction to the bill when it was presented to the Grand National Assembly:

> For centuries, Turkish women have worked in every field with men, they have suffered every kind of privation and oppression and they have shared in the prosperity as well as the disasters which have befallen this nation. They must therefore be given the right to take part in the legislative processes in the same way as they have the right to participate in matters affecting the family and their own circle. Our Republic has been established as a result of their patriotic endeavors. There is no place in our Republic and in our revolution for reactionary ideas stemming from the period of oppression and ignorance in our history. This motion is designed to give women the right to vote and the right to be elected to parliament so that we may benefit from the contribution they will make in the development of our country.[379]

The following year, 1935, in elections to the Grand National Assembly seventeed women gained places.[380]

Yet with regard to the enhanced status of women it must be remembered that there remains a great difference between the urban, cosmopolitan centres and the villages. When Landau, in 1938, said how impressed he was by Turkish women for "the thoroughness of their recent emancipation...it was astonishing how unself-conscious and sure of themselves they were",[381] he was almost certainly talking about the urban women. In many cases changes in the position in the urban areas

have failed to filter down to the villages. In fact, even in the urban setting, though the legal and official attitude to women may have changed there has been little if any shift in the outlook and opinions of many of the individual male members of society. Indeed, in 1984, one such individual still described Turkey to me as a "very masculine society".

The Family:

The leaders of the new Republic rightly recognised that if reform was to be successful it had to penetrate into the world of the family. Most of the reforms touched upon the family in some way; but the following are measures aimed specifically at the family.

In 1923, and again in 1924, the Grand National Assembly discussed a draft Family Code.[382] This Code was based on the Seriat and was eventually, for this reason, rejected.[383] It was felt that having a Family Code based on the Seriat was inappropriate for the new Republic.[384] This reasoning is highly significant as the Constitution of 1924 did not claim that Turkey was a secular state. The 1924 Constitution still stated that the religion of Turkey was Islam. This would tend to suggest that the collective thinking of the Grand National Assembly was more advanced than the thoughts they chose to express in the 1924 Constitution.

Another measure directly affecting the family was the policy, expressed in the 1926 Civil Code, that only those marriages contracted by an authorized representative of the state were recognised as valid.[385] This was not a shift in the nature of marriage from a sacrament

to a contract in civil law. In Islam marriage is not a sacrament but a legal contract. The change here is from a legal contract validated by the religious institutions, to one which is validated by the state. In this measure it is the law which is being secularized, not marriage.

Finally, on the 21st of June, 1934, a law was enacted requiring the use of family names.[386] All families had to choose and to register a joint name, the equivalent of the surname in Europe and America.

Kemal Statues:

The government of the Republic signalled their intention to depart from Islamic tradition in another way. On October 3rd, 1926 a statue of Mustafa Kemal was erected in Istanbul.[387] This was an important event as Islam strictly forbids the erection of human or animal images.[388] This prohibition is based on Qur'anic injunctions against idolatry with the following two verses of the Qur'an being cited:[389]

> And when Abraham said, 'My Lord,
> make this land secure, and turn me
> and my sons away from serving idols;
> my Lord, they have led astray many men...'(14:38)

and,

> O believers, wine and arrow-shuffling,
> idols and divining-arrows are an abomination,
> some of Satan's work; so avoid it; haply
> so you will prosper.(5:92)[390]

While it is true that there was a well established tradition of miniature painting in Ottoman Turkey, the miniatures were not on public display. They were very much the property of the elite and were for private display

only. This point about limited access was also true, though to a lesser extent, of the portraits of the Sultan which Mahmud II ordered to be hung in government offices from 1829.[391] The statue, however, was on public view. A year later, on November the 4th, 1927 another statue of Mustafa Kemal was erected, this time in Ankara.[392] These statues were, thus, a very public statement of the break with Islamic tradition.

Education:

On 3rd March 1924 the law on the unification of education was passed.[393] This law placed all education under the control of the Ministry of Education.[394] Giving the Ministry control of all educational establishments paved the way for the later move to close the medreses.[395] The need to close the medreses can be illustrated by the fact that as late as 1921 they taught "almost exclusively by rote memorization of the Qur'an and Arabic texts learned by reading aloud before the teacher".[396] This method of education had proved satisfactory for the more traditional religious needs of Ottoman society. Clearly however they were unsuited for the development of a Western nation envisaged by Ataturk. Under the rule of the Ottoman theocracy "religious schools and religious education in schools were unquestioned",[397] certainly for the population at large. Ataturk, on the other hand, saw Islamic education as an integral part of the old order and as a stumbling block to modernization.[398]

This attitude on the part of the group urging modernization of the Turkish state and the following

of a path to Westernization involved the teaching of religion in all state schools being prescribed.[399] This began in 1927 with the first stage of a two-part move against religious education. In this year religious classes in ordinary state schools became voluntary.[400] The second stage in the removal of religious education began in primary schools where religious classes were dropped in 1930 in urban schools.[401] This measure did not apply to village schools until 1933.[402] This difference in the year of implementation of the measure points to the urban-rural contrast which must always be kept in mind when looking at Turkey, particularly when looking at matters of development. Following this, in September 1931 religious classes were also abolished in middle schools.[403] This abolition of religious education was seen as necessary, but not necessarily as irreversible. As one leading figure in Turkish national education told Rom Landau in the late 1930s:

> In twenty years or more there may be a religious education in Turkey once again. But we cannot possibly have it today. Within one or two generations we must try to absorb that spirit of the new age which most of the Western nations have evolved slowly through many generations. The word 'religion' must not even be mentioned. It would only create confusion in the minds of the people and open doors to the reactionaries.[404]

An additional measure may be noted here for the sake of completeness. On 7th February 1924 a law was passed banning religious symbols from the inside of foreign schools.[405] These foreign schools were of two types. Firstly those providing a Western education

to those wishing to acquire one. Secondly denominational schools providing an education to members of specific religious groups. In April of the same year the government closed down all French and Italian schools in Turkey as those responsible for these schools refused to remove Roman Catholic symbols from their classrooms.[406] Generally speaking Christian missionaries were allowed to continue their educational work though the government repeatedly made it clear to them that it would not tolerate any direct proselytizing.[407] This may be illustrated by the incident at the American Girls Lycee in Bursa during 1928. In that year the school was closed down following charges being brought against it which alleged that three of its pupils had been converted to Christianity.[408] Three teachers from the school were charged under legislation forbidding proselytizing and were convicted on 30th April 1928.[409] Following an appeal the verdict was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 5th March, 1929.[410] The school was later allowed to reopen without the offending teachers.[411]

Another measure which directly concerned the foreign schools in Turkey was an order issued by the Ministry of Education in August 1931.[412] This order directed that history, geography and civics should be taught in the Turkish language by Turkish teachers.[413] Apart from these measures, however, foreign schools in Turkey were allowed to continue their work without undue interferance.

Following these early measures religious education between 1933 and 1949 went through a period of "benign

neglect".[414] Towards the end of this period however the situation was beginning to change. Though they belong chronologically to the period up to 1950, these developments in fact foreshadow the changes which were to take place in the period after 1950. But they may be stated here. On 24th December 1946 a debate was opened in the Turkish parliament.[415] The debate was concerned with worries that a complete lack of religious education would lead to a lack of ethical and moral qualities among the youth.[416] This debate did lead to concrete developments. In 1949 two hours per week of Muslim religious education were made available on a voluntary basis in the 4th and 5th grades of public elementary schools.[407]

One anomaly, noted by Reed, is worth repeating. He tells us that:

> From 1934 to 1948 the only indigenous, legal Islamic religious training available to Turkish Muslims was either as a routine part of basic armed forces training for recruits, or in the very elementary courses for memorizers of the Qur'an and on the Qur'an.[418]

This is remarkably strange as it is the army which is regarded as the guardian of Kemalism, and thus of secularism. So to have a situation in which these guardians of secularism are the only people providing a religious education is something of a surprise.

Feyzioglu points to a dual attitude towards the subject of religious education from the point of view of secularism in Turkey. As secularism "does not imply an anti-religious attitude" he tells us:

> the faith of children being educated at state

> schools has to be respected, while, of course, it is imperative that no education in direct conflict with the scientific approach be given.[419]

He sees, thus, the need to attempt to strike a balance between respect for individual beliefs and respect for the scientific outlook.

We are left in no doubt as to which element in the choice is to be given greater weight. Feyzioglu tells us that it is "totally undesirable to have a religious 'establishment'" free from state control and regulation "which conducts religious education completely outside of the supervision of the state".[420] In essence, you may take the religion out of the state, but you cannot remove the state from religion.

With regard to higher education two items need to be noted. Firstly the increasing inability of the Faculty of Theology at Istanbul University to attract students between 1924 and 1933.[421] The declining student population of this establishment can be seen from the following statement of student numbers:[422]

1924-25	284
1926-27	167
1927-28	53
1929-30	35
1932-33	20.

This probably simply reflects the fact that the professional and employment prospects which graduates of this institution could expect were declining in the new atmosphere of modernization and development. For the sake of completeness it may be noted that in 1949 a new Faculty of Theology was opened at Ankara University.[423] This will be discussed in more detail in the next section when we come to discuss the change in the situation

beginning about 1950.

We can now turn to the schools for the education and training of religious functionaries. In 1924 there were over 29 of these imam-hatip schools.[424] This number declined to only two in 1932[425] and in 1932-33 imam-hatip schools ceased operating.[426] Yet it came to be recognised that it was:

> essential to train qualified men of religion capable of comprehending the fact that secularism does not imply antagonism toward religion.[427]

The state was to try, in other words, to use religious functionaries as agents to promote the popular acceptance of secularism. This was turned into concrete action in 1948 with the opening of schools to train religious functionaries.[428]

Finally two more items may be included here. In 1929 school history books were rewritten to place more emphasis upon the ethnic background of the Turks and with "exaggerated and dubious theories about their origins and influence in the world".[429] Included in such efforts was the work of Turkish scholars to establish links between recent Turkish history and Hittite and Sumerian civilizations.[430] Considerable impetus was given to such work by Ataturk's belief in the antiquity and importance of Turkey. As he put it:

> My whole work for Turkey, everything I have done, would be meaningless if I did not believe that this country is the cradle of civilization. My faith in the antiquity and in the special role which Turkey must play in the history

> of the world has been my guiding principle through all my activities.[431]

At the same time, the rewriting of school books was part of the process, including the language reform, aimed at fostering national identity and at distancing the Turks from their Islamic neighbours with an Arabic and Persian based culture. This rewriting replaced the predominant Islamic emphasis in the earlier text books.

We can also note the effects of Western education upon the native superstitions. Kazamias notes that:

> as students acquire more formal education, they also change their attitudes concerning the role of Kismet in shaping their lives and their future.[432]

This would seem to justify the faith and emphasis which Ataturk placed on education as a means of fostering more Western and scientific attitudes which would assist the Westernization of Turkey.

Hat Reform:

We now come to consider the so-called hat reform. This series of events started on August the 24th, 1925. At that time in Kastamonu Ataturk and his fellow travellers discarded their fezes in favour of European-style hats.[433] Following this, on September the 2nd, the wearing of European dress was introduced and the wearing of the fez was prohibited.[434] This was re-inforced in the Grand National Assembly on the 25th of November 1925, when the Assembly outlawed the wearing of the fez and other forms of head-gear without brims.[435]

For Ataturk to discard his fez was one thing, for it to be required of the entire population was quite

another. The wearing of European-style hats was not completely unknown in Turkey for Armenian Christians, amongst others, had worn them before the Republic came into being. However it was most unusual for Muslim Turks to wear them. In fact, the demand that Turks should wear brimmed head-gear created a logistical problem for the society as a whole and for the particular individual. To begin with there was a problem of supply and demand; there were simply not enough caps or hats with brims in Turkey to fulfil the new demand. Hence the claim by Halide Edib that the major effect of the hat reform was to "enrich European hat factories at the expe se of the already impoverished Turks".[436] For the individual there was the problem of how to make the ritual prostration during prayer whilst wearing a hat with a brim. Often this problem was solved by turning a peaked cap back to front during prayers.

The change from one form of head-covering to another may, at first, seem trivial. Indeed Halide Edib saw it as the most "futile and superficial" of the reforms.[437] In fact, she went further:

> The Westernization of Turkey is not and should not be a question of mere external imitation and gesture...To tell the Turk to don a certain headdress and 'get civilized' or be hanged or imprisoned, is absurd, to say the least.[438]

But the effects of this reform were more profound than Halide Edib allows. We have noted the difficulty the new head-wear created for the Muslim during prayer. But the symbolic nature of the change went much deeper. As Berkes explains: "the changing of headcovering did

indeed symbolize an important change in mentality".[439] This may be better understood by fully appreciating the reason for, and depth of the attachment of the Turk to the fez. Gokalp has outlined this attachment as follows:

> When the people prefer the fez or fur cap to the hat, they do it not because they think one is more nygienic or cheaper than the other, but because these objects symbolize a meaning, a value cherished in the national consciousness.[440]

Indeed the strength of this attachment is still more surprising when it is recalled that the fez was only introduced into Turkey in 1828 on the instructions of Mahmud II.[441] At that time strong measures were needed to forestall and, if need be, suppress opposition to the fez.[442] Indeed, doubts were expressed as to whether the fez could be properly regarded as an Islamic head-covering.[443]

For Ataturk this pre-existing national sentiment or consciousness had to be reshaped and redefined in particular terms. The rejection of the fez in favour of the cap or brimmed hat served, yet again, to redefine national consciousness in terms of equality and identity with European nations. As Ataturk himself explained the move when speaking during 1927:

> It was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on the heads of our nation as an emblem of ignorance, negligence, fanaticism, and hatred of progress and civilization, to accept in its place the hat, the headgear used by the whole civilized world, and in this way to demonstrate that the Turkish nation, in its mentality as in other respects, in no way diverges from civilized social life.[444]

It is important, however, to note here that the veil has never been outlawed in Turkey.[445] Yet we need be left in no doubt as to Ataturk's feelings on the matter. In Kastamonu on 30th August, 1925, Ataturk expressed his feelings towards the veil thus:

> In some places I have seen women who put a piece of cloth or a towel or something like it over their heads to hide their faces, and who turn their backs or huddle themselves on the ground when a man passes by. What are the meaning and sense of this behaviour? Gentlemen, can the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation adopt this strange manner, this barbarous posture? It is a spectacle that makes the nation an object of ridicule. It must be remedied at once.[446]

Despite such words the veil was never outlawed as mentioned above, but today it is not at all common in the urban centres.

Religious Clothing:

In December 1934 a law was passed which prohibited the wearing of ecclesiastical garments outside mosques and churches.[447] This measure came into force on the 15th of June, 1935.[448] In earlier periods clothing worn had given precise indications of the religious allegiances of the individual. Not only were there distinctive features of dress for individual tarikats, but clothing also distinguished the various grades within one tarikat from one another. This had often proved a source of conflict with religious rivalries erupting on the street. In addition this was an important move as it limited the ability of strangers to pay respect to religious men in the street, as religious function-

aries were no longer recognisable to the public outside of their place of worship.

Language Reform:

The language reform is one of the most widely known reforms of the early Republican period. The beginnings of the language reform are, however, to be found before the Republic came into being. By 1908 many Turkish novelists and journalists were trying to bring the written form of the language closer to the spoken form.[449] A little later, during 1911, a group of writers in Salonica, grouped around the journal Genç Kalemler ('Young Pens'), started to demand the suppression of Arabic and Persian words and their replacement with native Turkish words where such existed.[450] They also wished to abandon those rules of Arabic and Persian grammar which had found their way into Turkish over the centuries.[451]

Once the Republic was established language reform could get underway in earnest. In 1928 the Latin script was adopted to replace the Arabic script in which Turkish had been written up to that time.[452] After it was decided to adopt the Latin script an intensive campaign of instruction was initiated with the aim of teaching the new script to those who had used the Arabic one.[453] Ataturk himself toured the nation with the new alphabet and became "the chief instructor of the School of the Nation".[454] He pushed the alphabet reform through in a matter of months against bitter opposition from conservative and religious quarters.[455] Despite the opposition the reform went through and demands for the

restoration of the old script have, ever since, tended to be equated with religious and political reaction.[456] In November 1928, a law was enacted banning the use of the Arabic script in all public affairs after the first of December.[457] Indeed, Article 526 of the Penal Code prohibits the printing of Turkish books in the Arabic script.[458] So by 1929 Turkish books and newspapers began to appear in the new Latin script.[459]

With specific regard to the change in alphabet there can be seen one particular hope and two specific reservations. The hope was that the adoption of the Latin script would facilitate a rapid increase in the rate of literacy.[460] The Latin alphabet was felt to be easier to learn, a point which has been so well communicated by the hierarchy in Turkey that most younger Turks today are convinced that Ottoman Turkish, written in the old script, is virtually impossible to learn.

The two specific worries were both to an extent concerned with the perdeptions of those outside Turkey. In the first place, the Latin alphabet had been adopted by the Albanian Muslims who were considered to have "ceded from the Ottoman Empire and from Islam".[461] More conservative elements within the new Republic could not help but worry in case the new alphabet should mean that they too were felt to have ceded from Islam.

Secondly, a similar movement towards the adoption of the Latin script was underway among the Turkish-speaking peoples of the Soviet Union.[462] Would the adoption of the new alphabet lead some to wonder if the similarity of the move with that of the peoples within the

Soviet Union was not signisicant.

On the whole, however, the adoption of the Latin script was a positive move as it did have a beneficial effect on rates of literacy, as well as the more superficial effect of making the Turkish books and newspapers look more Western.

Following a familiar pattern moves were then made to eliminate the alternatives in an effort to re-inforce the new measures. We have seen that laws were passed prohibiting the use of the Arabic script with the Turkish language. The next step was one to eliminate Arabic and Persian languages from the Turkish system of schooling.[463] This occurred on the twenty-ninth of August 1929, when instruction in Arabic and Persian languages was banned from the curriculum of Turkish schools.[464]

The energy devoted to language reform is well justified by the importance of language which can be "such an important uniting element that it often draws ethnically diverse peoples together under a common nationalistic ideology".[465] Yet in this regard language is something of a double edged sword as ethnic minorities, such as those in the Southeast of Turkey, tend to cling to their own language tenaciously.[466]

Language reform was not, of course, confined to matters of education and script. Indeed, the strongly nationalistic and Westernizing nature of the early Republican regime very much favoured the more radical linguistic reformers who wished to remove many of the foreign elements from Turkish.[467] The new regime certainly could not tolerate the cleavage between the

Turkish of the educated classes and that of the masses.[468]

As Ataturk put it:

> The Turkish nation, which knew how to defend its country and noble independence, must also liberate its language from the yoke of foreign languages.[469]

In this connection the Turk Dil Kurumu, Turkish Language Society, was founded in 1932.[470] The Society was to work consistently over the years for the purification of the Turkish language by removing words of foreign origin and replacing them with "pure Turkish" words. However, the Society's attitude towards words borrowed from European languages was more tolerant than their attitude towards words borrowed from Arabic and Persian.[471] This is understandable in the secularizing atmosphere as so much of the prestige given to Arabic and Persian is tied up with their status as Islamic languages.[472] Though many French words have been borrowed over the last 150 years, these seem to have been thought less of a threat to the individuality of Turkish than were the Arabic and Persian borrowings.[473]

Linguistic reform came to a temporary halt after the death of Ataturk in 1938, but was re-activated under Inonu in 1941.[474] Ever since that time there have been periodic purges of old words and attempts to introduce and to popularise new ones.

Liturgical Languages:

The leaders of the Republic also set about reforming the languages used in worship. The use of the Turkish language in worship was passionately supported by Ziya Gokalp.[475] He insisted that "Turkism in religion simply

means having religious scriptures, sermons, and preaching all in Turkish".[476] A good argument was made out for this move on the grounds that conducting religious services in the language of the common people would help to increase their understanding of the teachings of Islam. It was presented as a move which would help rather than hinder Islam in Turkey.

In 1933 the Arabic Call to Prayer was prohibited.[477] This cannot be portrayed as a move to strengthen Islam by making it more understandable to native Turkish speakers. The Call to Prayer is always the same and its meaning is well understood by Turkish Muslims. This reform was simply a piece of zealous language purification. Yet this prohibition was given the backing of Article 526 of the Penal Code which declared that every Muezzin who did not give the Call to Prayer in Turkish was liable to imprisonment.[478]

Such attempts to change the use of Arabic as a liturgical language met with opposition. The pious maintained, as they always had done, that it was not permissible to offer the ritual prayer in a language other than Arabic.[479]

Today in Turkey the Call to Prayer and the ritual prayers are offered in Arabic, but the sermon on Friday is generally given in Turkish. In furtherance of the aim of making the teachings of Islam more available to the Turkish speaker many translations of the Qur'an have appeared in Turkish since 1923.[480] Though these are used for private study of the meaning of texts, not for liturgical purposes.[481]

Dervish Orders:

The Dervish Orders had a great deal of influence over the mass of the people and thus were the target for reform at an early stage in the history of the Republic. As Brockelmann puts it: "the religious life of the people was affected more by the dervish orders... than by the official clergy".[482] During the Ottoman period, while the ulema were becoming a wealthy hereditary group somewhat removed from the ordinary people the leaders of the dervish orders remained as part of the people, with immense influence and prestige among them.[483] At times their influence was most welcome as when they took part in the expansion of Islam and were most prominent in work at the frontiers of the expanding Islamic world. This is noted by Brockelmann who comments: "it cannot be denied that to a great extent the orders exercised a civilising effect under conditions of barbarism."[484] However, in the modern period the very conservative, and often autocratic influence of the leaders of dervish orders had been a great obstacle to reform. As Lewis points out, the influence of the dervish orders was such that they were described as "a religion within a religion, and a state within a state".[485] During the period of reform in the Nineteenth Century, however, after a limited amount of initial resistance, the leaders of the dervish orders seemed to have been largely indifferent to the reforms and discussions of the time.[486]

The influence of the heads of the orders on their followers cannot be over-estimated. The head of an

order was the spiritual director of the members of the order. This was the basis of their influence as a novice owed "blind obedience" to his spiritual director.[487] The relationship, thus, took the form of charismatic domination. Charismatic domination is characterized by obedience not to rules or traditions but to a person of imputed holiness, heroism or some extraordinary quality.[488] This type of obedience is not open to being challenged successfully at the rational level, as the domination is not rationally based in the first place. The very act of recognizing an authority based on holiness implies a total submission to that authority. It is against this background of total obedience to the dervish leaders that we must see the measures taken by Ataturk to counter their influence. This effort to counter their influence took place, in fact, despite the fact that there was no uniform response from the dervish orders to the early nationalist movement under Ataturk. While the leaders of some dervish orders gave active and effective support to the Army of the Caliphate, mobilised by the Sultan-Caliph against the nationalists, ten other dervish leaders were members of the first Grand National Assembly in Ankara.[489]

During the early reform period it became apparent that it was from the dervishes rather than from the ulema that the main opposition to secularism would come.[490] Because of this it was realised that something must be done to bread the dervish leaders' conservative influence if the attempt to reform Turkey into a modern Republic were to be a success. On September 30th, 1935 Ataturk spoke thus of the dervish orders:

> I cannot accept the existence, in the civilized Turkish community, of people so primitive as to seek their material and spiritual wellbeing through the guidance of any old sheikh, today, when they stand in the radiant presence of learning and science, of civilization and all that it means...the Republic of Turkey can never be the land of sheikhs, dervishes, and lay-brothers. The straightest, truest Way [tarikat] is the way of civilization...The heads of the orders will grasp this truth... and will at once close their tekkes, of their own accord. They will acknowledge that their disciples have at last attained right guidance.[491]

Thus it was that dervish orders were outlawed,[492] and all tekkes (Turkish order-centres)[493] were closed.[494] These decrees were published by the Cabinet on the 2nd of September, 1925, and covered by a law enacted on the 30th of November.[495] This law, no. 677 also banned the use of honorific terms associated with the dervish orders such as sheikh, baba and so on; and practises of fortune telling, faith healing and such were also banned.[496] Generally speaking these measures against folk-religion aroused far more opposition than did the abolition of the Caliphate, or the replacement of Islamic law with the Civil Code in 1926.[497]

These measures achieved varying degrees of success with many dervish orders continuing to function clandestinely. Undoubtedly they were bold reforms to attempt so early in the life of the Republic. But it was recognised that unless this step was taken quickly all other reforms would be more difficult, or even impossible to carry out.

Secularism Under Inonu:

Ismet Inonu who became President of the Republic after the death of Ataturk, was born in Izmir in 1884.[498] Although his view of secularism allowed more room for religious freedom,[499] Alderman tells us that:

> officially at least, there were no major changes in the application of Kemal's secularization principles from his death to the commencement of the multi-party system.[500]

The reforms were certainly not dismantled, but equally there were no major new reforms introduced and existing measures were executed with less vigour. The new situation was well stated by F. R. Akay, the spokesman for a delegation from the Turkish press visiting India in 1943. He said:

> We are Turks first and then Muslims. We have no interest in any kind of project for Islamic unity...For us religion is a very honourable personal thing, but it has no place in Turkish politics.[501]

Despite the lack of new reforms one measure deserves a mention here. On 11th November 1942 law no. 4305 was passed by the Grand National Assembly.[502] This introduced a new element of taxation called the Varlik Vergisi or Capital Levy.[503] The stated aim of this tax was to soak up part of the windfall profits being made by speculative businessmen in the inflationary period during World War II.[504] It was imposed on businessmen, factory owners and real estate agents and was assessed by a special committee made up of businessmen and government officials.[505] It is mentioned here because the firms of the non-Muslim minorities were, according to Karpat, "subjected to the

tax in an arbitrary and unrealistic way".[506] Non-Muslims seem to have paid, in fact, up to ten times as much in this tax as did the Muslims.[507] In an address to the People's Party in June 1943, the then Prime Minister Saracoglu claimed that this discrimination had been purely accidental, the minority community had, he claimed, simply been the most wealthy.[508] But it is more believable to see the tax as an expression of a policy of economic nationalism.[509] In March 1944 the law was repealed.[510] But, as Hale concludes:

> By this time...serious damage had been done to the Republic's reputation for fair treatment of the minorities, besides much suffering to those affected.[511]

This measure demonstrates that despite the even-handed and secular principles which find expression in the Turkish Constitution of 1924, discrimination on the grounds of religion was still possible this far into the Republic.

This completes our review of the reforms in Turkey up to 1950. In the following section we will turn to the period following 1950 to examine the contemporary situation and the changes brought about since the start of the multi-party system. The desire underlying the reforms so far mentioned was well expressed by "one of Ataturk's oldest coleagues" who told Landau:

> We want to return to the Orient as Orientalists, but not as Orientals. As students and critics of the Orient, not as a part of it.[512]

SECTION FOUR

TURKEY AFTER 1950

By 1938 when Ataturk died, many people considered Islam to be doomed as a vital force in the cultural and social life of Turkey.[1] But Islamic faith is still strong in Republican Turkey although its position and role in social life are somewhat ambiguous.[2] Even though tradition and force of habit certainly count for something, this cannot by itself be an argument which accounts for the attachment to Islam to be found in the Turkish population.[3] For, as Heyd points out, there has been "an impressive resurgence of religious feeling and interest" in the latest phase of Turkish history.[4] Though Millar argues that what some are calling the resurgence of Islam in Turkey is simply the emergence of "a balance of respect" between religious groups and the state.[5] As Lewis reminds us it is not accurate to speak of a religious revival in Turkey, as "that which has never lost its vitality can scarcely be revived".[6]

Looking at the situation in Turkey after 1950, Heyd argued that very little had changed. In the Ottoman Empire the state was to a considerable extent subject to religion.[7] In the Republic, on the other hand, religion is subject to the state with religious functionaries appearing to be "but minor civil servants".[8] This is hardly what one would understand by the term secularism. What has changed, Heyd explains is:

> not the integration of religious and secular institutions but the measure of the political

influence of their respective functionaries.[9] The Islamic polity has been destroyed and the state has established the administrative apparatus necessary for it to inspect and, if need be, control the religious sphere.

Yet, as Feyzioglu points out, in adopting the principles of secularism Turkey has not divorced itself from the essence of the Islamic tradition.[10] Islamic attitudes and traditions exert an important influence on the lives of Turks and, he says, will continue to do so.[11]

Islam is strong in present day Turkey.[12] Despite being eliminated from political life, Islam is firmly rooted in the hearts and minds of the people.[13] The secular leaders have not attempted any major reforms of religion since 1950. However, though freedom of conscience and belief are much praised as products of the secularizing movement yet "traditionalists, modernists or Alevis, to say nothing of non-Muslim religious minorities may feel that their points of view receive inadequate attention".[14] They may also at times feel themselves to be the victims of subtle or even more open discrimination.[15] Opinion is free, but perhaps some opinions are more free than others.

Staunch secularists, seeing this revival of religious feeling, felt that it was fanned by survivors from the Ottoman period with a sentimental attachment to tradition.[16] They have been apprehensive in case granting full autonomy to Islamic institutions might lead to their being controlled by reactionary elements.[17] After 1950 extremist religious propaganda has been in evidence from time to time.[18]

The group most responsible for this has been the Nurcus.[19]

The Nurcus:

The Nurcus are one of the most prominent religious groups to be outspoken in opposition to secularism. It will be useful to look at some of their opinions in a certain amount of detail, to see the nature of some of the views which oppose the official ideology in the modern Republic.

Said Nursi, founder of the Nurcus, received only a traditional, Islamic education.[20] He seems to have had a fixed attitude to modernism and Westernization in his early years as it is reported that he took part in a conservative counter-revolution against the Young Turks in 1909.[21] However, in the Republic he kept cautiously out of the limelight until the multi-party period.[22]

According to the Nurcu interpretation of the War of Independence, or Liberation, Ataturk was supported by the people in order that the Caliphate and Sultanate could be saved by expelling the enemy (the European powers) from Turkey.[23] Thus the nation which backed Ataturk during the war was "full of faith and ready to die for the sake of God".[24] They were not at the time fighting for the Ataturk reforms. There is no historical reason for finding fault with this interpretation.

The Ataturk period, however, is seen by the Nurcus as a period of irreligion and decline.[25] It was this irreligion which created the opportunity for communists to infiltrate into Turkey.[26] The main thrust of the Ataturk reforms is not understood as being an attempt to

separate the affairs of state from religious matters. Rather it is seen as the state using atheism to oppose both religion itself, and religious people.[27] They consider that the reforms went so far as to make the performance of religious duties impossible.[28] The Nurcus insist that Nationalism must not replace Islam.[29] Religion and nation cannot be separated out in the way envisaged by the reformers: the Nurcus claim that "our nationality is Islam".[30] In fact, the Nurcus will not accept apostate Muslims as Turks but regard them rather as Europeans "disguised" as Turks.[31]

Under Ataturk, the Nurcus state, strenuous campaigns were launched to make people forget the social values which would have united them as a nation.[32] Further they insist that none of the reforms was accepted willingly by the people but all were imposed upon them forcibly.[33] Following from this, they interpret the election of the Democrat Party to replace the Republican People's Party in government in the elections of 1950, as the nation taking the first opportunity to reject the reforms "by making a white revolution and...practising Islam even more exuberantly as a reaction to the previous authoritarian regime".[34] The way in which secularization was implemented, they argue, merely resulted in the Muslim population being alienated from the state.[35] The ambiguity of the concept of secularism, in addition, meant that the innocent exercise of the individual's religious freedom was assumed to be an offence.[36] This resulted in people being unjustly put behind bars, for their religious and moral convictions.[37]

The Nurcus also argue that any greatness which the

Turks, as a nation, may have achieved, is directly linked with their being Muslims. When the Turks followed religion closely, they explain, they have been held in high regard by other nations.[38] However, when the Turks deviated from their religion, they also fell from this high esteem.[39] With regard to this position two things may be noted. Firstly, this reminds us very much of the nineteenth century argument which saw the decline of the Ottoman Empire as being the direct result of the Empire's deviations from Islamic law. (This argument was noted in Section Two.) Secondly, it is worth remarking that when the Nurcus refer to the Turks being held in high esteem by other nations it is surely only to other Islamic nations that they refer. It was never the case that a nation, the Ottoman Empire included, was held in high regard by the European powers for its adherence to Islam. This surely provides an indication as to the foreign policy orientation which would most please the Nurcus, as it would be in the Middle East and the Islamic world only where a people, the Turks, would find favour for their loyalty to Islam.

The Nurcus state that the Caliphate is both a religious and an administrative institution which represents the unity of the Muslim world.[40] They go on to argue that had the Caliphate not been abolished by the Grand National Assembly that the Turks would have "received more benefit than harm from it".[41] Somewhat curiously, this assessment is backed up by making reference to the Queen of Great Britain and her position within the constitutional framework of the British government.[42] The argument

seeming to suggest a possible role for a Caliph as both an ambassador general, and a symbolic personage who attracts the good-will and the respect of foreigners. However it is not necessary for the Caliphate to be invested in any one person in this way. The Nurcus argue that in this century the Caliphate must be represented not by a man, but by a council.[43] They claim that most Muslim scholars would accept this position.[44] This position demonstrates that the Nurcus do not simply wish to return to the position prior to the Ataturk reforms. They are not simply and solely reactionaries. Though they do wish there to be a Caliphate, they are willing to go forward toward a new type of Caliphate, rather than simply re-establishing the old institution in its traditional form.

With regard to the question of religious education the position adopted by the Nurcus could also be shared by others in Turkey during the multi-party period. They consider that "religious training" should be included in all levels of education.[45] Though this runs contrary to the Ataturk reforms we have no doubt that others in Turkey have come to the same position in response to fears that the lack of any religious education was creating a moral vacuum amongst young people.

The Nurcus have no real sympathy with the process of language reform. They consider that it is as a direct result of the language reform that Turkey is "alienated" from Islam and from the Islamic world.[46]

Said Nursi himself argued that polygamy should be re-introduced.[47] Nurcus do argue, however, that under

normal conditions monogamy is the most desirable form of marriage.[48] In Islam polygamy is neither encouraged nor required, they state.[49] Polygamy is merely permitted in Islam as "a precaution taken against falling into a worse position".[50] The Nurcus maintain that the actual consequence of the prohibition of polygamy was that the reformers "had to officially accept the existence of many brothels".[51] If polygamy were allowed, they argue, subject to the conditions stated in Islamic law, this would provide "an outlet which suited the true nature of mankind".[52] Thus the repeal of the law outlawing polygamy is seen as a weapon in the battle against promiscuity. It need not be spelled out that this represents a typically masculine, one might even say sexist, point of view. Nevertheless, the Nurcus' dislike for the reform prohibiting polygamy is clear enough.

With regare to the Department of Religious Affairs the Nurcus have one specific complaint. This is that the Department has never worked to awaken the religious consciousness of the people.[53] This is an important complaint as it reveals a great difference in the way in which the Department is viewed by the Nurcus and by those in government circles. The official government view would not be at all shocked or displeased with the failure of the Department to perform this consciousness raising task. This is simply because the official view does not see this as being in any way the function of the Department. Indeed, one can reasonably suspect that if the Department was ever perceived to be taking an openly evangelistic stance, that it would be almost immediately disbanded or

reformed.

Said Nursi demanded that all Western innovations should be abolished.[54] Clearly this attitude would most probably lead to the rejection of all of the Ataturk reforms. It is clear that the statements of those who supported Westernization deeply wounded that section who find their feelings articulated by the Nurcus. As the Nurcus argue today: "to beg for civilization from Europe was an insult to Islam".[55] In addition to this rejection of the notion that civilization in any true sense cannot be found in Islam, the Nurcus argue that on the material level there is no contradiction between Islam and Western science and technology.[56] Thus, the Nurcus would see no need to abandon any material comforts or advantages which modern science and technology have made possible.

The Nurcus are strongly opposed to Kemalism and long to see Islamic rule in Turkey.[57] Nursi himself claimed that the constitution of Turkey should be the Qur'an and that the only law should be the law of Islam.[58] The state should be controlled, he argued, by a council of ulema.[59] Yet modern Nurcus reject the use of force as a means of transforming the state.[60] They believe that it is not for them to inforce Islamic law.[61] When society is ready to embrace Islamic law, they argue, God will create a means to enforce it.[62]

The Nurcus consider that it is not their task to get involved in politics "for the sake of it", but rather to help those politicians who seem to support religion.[63] It is for this reason that they do not seem to have set up a tightly-knit political organization along the lines

of a political party.[64] The Nurcu support for political parties is not indiscriminate. It is reported that the Nurcus did not support the National Salvation Party because they consider its allegiance to religion to be insincere.[65]

The Nurcus, despite their lack of sympathy with the Ataturk reforms, are not wholly opposed to the Republic. They state that in a Republic the law must be supreme.[66] One of the most forceful reasons for the Nurcus albeit grudging acceptance of the Republic is their fear of the alternative. They consider that the only alternative to a democratic Republic at the present time would be a totalitarian communist regime.[67] A shift to communism would have disastrous consequences as the Nurcus see it: "if we lose the Republic in Turkey, we will lose Islam too".[68] It is by no means clear that a totalitarian regime of the left is the only alternative to democratic government in Turkey at present. A regime of the far right is no less plausible. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that the fear of communism is a prominent factor in the Nurcu approach to the current political situation.

Though the Nurcus were a divisive force in the country they do not appear to have been a threat to the existence of the state.[69] Yet official circles appear to have perceived the Nurcus as a major threat to the continuance of secularism in Turkey. From time to time many Nurcus have been arrested and tried for breaches, or alleged breaches, of the secularist legislation. Yet the effect of these trials has been somewhat counter-productive. As Mermer concludes:

> The much-publicised trials of Nurcus can be

> understood as vigorous attempts to implement the Kemalist reforms and prevent a return to obscurantism. But they...misfired. They served chiefly to give the impression...that Nurcus were valiant upholders of the faith against authorities that were in league with the devil.[70]

Here we must conclude our brief look at the Nurcus. We have attempted to show that while the Nurcus are certainly opposed to the Ataturk reforms, the extent to which they pose a serious threat to the existence of the state has generally been over-estimated. However, it is an indication of the dislike for the reforms in certain sectors of the society that the Nurcus, as a group, have continued to exist to this day. Yet it must also be remembered that the views which find expression among the Nurcus have never seemed to be those of a majority of the population.

The reforms had been adopted by the upper-classes but had not percolated down to the villages.[71] Marked bifurcations continue to exist between urban and rural dwellers with this being particularly noticeable between an educated urban elite and an illiterate village population.[72] In the countryside there are still innumerable superstitions and people still "live with their demons and angels".[73] Islam as a force in regulating the life of villagers is still strong.[74] Early in the multi-party period the elite rediscovered just how deep was the attachment of the mass of peasants to traditional Islamic beliefs and rituals.[75] In order to secure their votes a modification of official attitudes became necessary.

Attempts were made to prove the revolution to have been anti-clerical rather than anti-religious.[76] Nevertheless, the upper-class, regardless of political affiliation, is unwilling to turn back the clock and abandon the major achievements of the revolution.[77] However Turkish conversations, even concerning the most mundane matters, are often still a fabric of religious expressions.[78] The secularist ideology has taken firm root among the educated urban classes, particularly in the cosmopolitan centres.[79] As Feyzioglu states, it is an "Obvious fact" that Turkey cannot return to being a theocratic state ruled by fetva.[80] This would be the majority view in modern Turkey.

Among the general signs of the religious revival are: a renewed interest in mosque building, thriving religious journals, widespread interest in Muslim festivals and increasingly open veneration of saints.[81] The latest available figures for Islamic publications in Turkey tell us that in 1984 505 Islamic books were published in Turkey out of a total number of books published of 7,224.[82] This figure does not include novels or poetry with Islamic themes.[83] It is, in addition, likely that this figure is an under-estimate as books of Islamic economic ideas, for example, could be regarded as economic, rather than religious books, thus making the figure quoted above most probably a conservative estimate. In the villages, marriages are still often arranged by the parents and celebrated according to Islamic tradition.[84] But marriages are increasingly being registered officially with the civil authorities. A fairly large part of the

still observe the fast during the month of Ramadan.[85] Yet again, the proportion is greater in the rural than in the Western urban areas.[86] Attendance at the mosque is still widespread.[87] Feyzioglu goes so far as to claim that Muslims in Turkey continue "to worship God with a piety of devotion and faith" second to that in no other Islamic country.[88]

In 1950 the Call to Prayer was once again permitted in Arabic.[89] This took place on June 16th following an anouncement by the newly elected Democrat Party government.[90] To this extent the reforms were put into reverse, and, though a small measure, this was much appreciated by the general population. In addition, the new government also sanctioned the broadcasting of readings of the Qur'an on state radio.[91] Today in Turkey the position with regard to liturgical languages is that the Friday sermon is now delivered in Turkish after recitation of some verses from the Qur'an in Arabic.[92] Thus the desires of both Gokalp and Ataturk are fulfilled while the people retain the Call to Prayer in Arabic.

With regard to the dervish orders, the substantial mystical tradition of Turkey with its spiritual values was preserved after the outward abolition of the orders.[93] In 1950 visiting the tombs of saints was again legalised.[94] This was a notable concession to popular worship. Today tombs of various saints continue to be the sites of various superstitious customs aimed at securing the saint's aid or intercession. From what we saw in the last section we can be sure that this development would not have met with Ataturk's approval. By 1960 an accomodation was

taking place between modern Turkish life and popular Islam.[95] The existence of the dervish orders as organized groups continued to be against the law.[96] But the authorities have been inclined to overlook this as long as the groups refrained from direct political involvement and from attacking the memory of Ataturk.[97] Thus, in practice many of the restraints have been lifted from the dervish orders.[98] In this regard the Ataturk reforms have been dismantled in practice, if not in theory.

We mentioned above the Nurcu attitude to the new situation of the Republic. Another religious group, the Tijanis, are also worth mentioning. In 1951 this group smashed statues of Ataturk in various parts of the country.[99] This outbreak of iconoclasm was in support of the Islamic prohibition of graven images.[100]

The alphabet reform has lasted to the present day and gained general acceptance. Yet in the 1960s, Schimmel reports, many villagers still regarded the Latin alphabet as "infidel letters".[101]101

With regard to the secularization of education several factors are worth noting. Following a full-dress debate in 1949 the Grand National Assembly permitted courses in Islam to be introduced in the fourth and fifth grades of elementary schools.[102] At first parents had to opt into these classes for their children, but later parents had to opt out if they wished their children not to attend.[103] In fact: "by 1950 the great majority of primary school children took the course in religious education".[104] The main argument for the re-introduction of religious education was the danger of allowing Turkish

youth to grow up in a moral vacuum. Now in Turkey religious classes have been introduced into the curricula of secondary schools.[105] School history books are being extensively re-written to correct "faulty information" about Islam and Ottoman history.[106] This is because, as Vehbi Dincerler the Minister of Education explained: "the government prefers to give the new generation a magnificent history, rather than a shameful one".[107] There can be no quarrel with this process if it only corrects some of the imbalances in earlier history books, but the results of the re-writing must be awaited with interest to see the extent to which Islam and the Islamic period of Turkish history has been re-emphasised. Before leaving religious education in schools, however, one interesting feature of the developing situation must be mentioned. In the early 1960s Scott obtained some interesting results when he asked the heads of village households if children ought to receive religious education in school. Only about 23% were in favour, with more than 60% against.[108] The reason for this perhaps unexpected result was that the villagers felt that religious instruction should take place in the mosque and be given by the religious leader of the village, not the school teacher.[109] In addition to the developments noted above there are also plans to introduce tuition in Arabic as a selective subject in high schools and universities.[110]

Since 1950 there has been a steady increase in opportunities and institutions for Islamic religious education.[111] Secondary schools for training religious

functionaries re-opened offering six-year courses.[112] Seven of these imam-hatip schools were established between 1949 and 1951.[113] By 1981-82 however this number had grown considerably with 336 imam-hatip schools operating in that year.[114] It is a measure of how cautiously Kemalists viewed these developments that Menderes, the Democrat Party Prime Minister, felt the need to make a declaration of support for secularism in order to reassure them. In 1950 he said his party was devoted to secularism and to the development of higher religious education.[115]

This assertion was especially necessary with reference to a new institution, the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University. Menderes and his government were not responsible for setting it up, but its establishment, taken with the developments noted above, created a certain fear amongst strict Kemalists that the revolution was about to be dismantled.

On June 4th, 1949, law 5424 was adopted to set up a Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University.[116] The Faculty opened on the 31st October, 1949.[117] Government scholarships were available to the students.[118] A booklet published by the Faculty in 1959 provides details of the curriculum.[119] In that year the number of hours per week devoted to each subject was as follows:

1st YEAR;	
Arabic	8
Persian	4
A Western Language, (English, German or French)	3
Religious Texts In Classical Turkish	3
Qur'an And The Essentials Of Islam	2

History Of Islam	2
2nd YEAR;	
Arabic	6
Persian	2
Western Language	3
Religious Texts In Classical Turkish	2
Qur'an And The Essentials Of Islam	2
History Of Islam	2
Psychology Of Religion	1
Sociology Of Religion	3
Philosophy And Logic	1
3rd YEAR;	
Arabic	4
Western Language	2
History Of Islam	2
Tafsir (Qur'anic exegesis)	2
Hadith (Islamic Traditions)	2
History Of Islamic Creed And Its Sects	2
Kalam (Islamic Theology)	2
Islamic Philosophy	2
Philosophy And Logic	2
History Of Ancient Philosophy	1
History Of Religions	2
Psychology Of Religion	2
Islamic Law	2
History Of Islamic Arts	2
History Of Islamic Decorative Arts And Palaeography	1
4th YEAR;	
Arabic	6
Western Language	2
History Of Islam	2
Tafsir	4
Hadith	4
History Of The Islamic Religion And Its Sects	4
Islamic Philosophy	2
History Of Religions	2
History Of Islamic Arts	2
Pedagogics, The Science Of Education And Its Practice	2
History Of Sufism	2
Turkish And Islamic Decorative Arts	1
History Of The Revolution	2. 120.

It can be seen that in addition to the Islamic sciences of law, exegesis and so on, the inclusion of subjects such as the psychology and sociology of religion gave a significantly non-traditional look to the work of the

Faculty. It is also noticeable that tuition in European languages is considered worthy of more time than tuition in Persian. We mentioned above that Durkheim considered it to be a mark of secularization that religion should lay itself open to scientific investigation, so the establishment of the Faculty may be seen as a secularizing move. However, it must also be remembered that one of the motives behind the development of the Faculty and the imam-hatip schools was to produce a new group of religious functionaries who were both better educated and more well-disposed to the Republican regime. The opening of the Faculty, however, was a most significant development and to some extent can be seen to signal the situation in Turkey following 1950.

As mentioned above, much of the revival of interest in religious education was due to fears that the youth were being brought up in a "moral vacuum".[121] It was generally agreed that: "sound standards of personal and social morality have to be imparted to children".[122] Many felt that modern secular society had lost some of the spiritual moorings so necessary for its survival.[123] Such attitudes were not limited to villagers and the uneducated. Heyd tells us that:

> Turkish nationalism and Western civilization... have proved incapable of filling, even for many educated Turks, the spiritual vacuum created by the elimination of Islam.[124]

Heyd's statement can be taken to support the view that Islam was never eliminated in Turkey because, at the personal level, secularism could not replace Islam and Islam continued to be strong there despite the reforms.

1961 Constitution:

Following the military take-over of 1960 a new constitution was prepared which became operative in the following year. In preparing the new constitution no single foreign constitution was taken as a model by the Constitutional Commission.[125] However, substantial attention was paid to the constitutions established in West Germany and Italy following the World War II.[126] In view of developments under the Democrat Party government in the late 1950s the reason given for the attention paid to these two foreign constitutions is interesting. These two were of importance because they were introduced into countries which had "thrown off dictatorial regimes and established successfully an order based on Western concepts of Democracy".[127] Although it is misleading to state that Germany had "thrown off" the Nazi regime, it is interesting to note that those involved in preparing the new constitution saw the Turkish position as being comparable with that in post-war Germany.

When explaining the "fundamental principles" adopted by the Constitutional Commission Enver Ziya Karal, chairman of the Commission, stated that they had agreed that "it shall be indicated that the Turkish state is a secular and democratic Republic".[128] Consequently, Article 2 of the constitution declares the state to be secular.[129]

Tarik Zafer Tunaya, rapporteur of the Commission and Constituent Assembly representative for Istanbul, reported that the Commission considered secularism to be indispensible for the protection of the reforms and of democracy.[130] Another rapporteur of the Commission,

Muamer Aksoy, pointed out that it was necessary to give secularism constitutional protection in view of the occasional eruption of reaction in the country.[131]

Some criticisms of this article were also expressed. Sadettin Tokboy, an Assembly representative of the Republican Peasant National Party (RPNP), thought that the principle was not clearly and adequately expressed.[132] Mehmet Altinson, also of the RPNP, thought that the lack of a definition of the concept of secularism was a great deficiency.[133] Yet another RPNP representative, Ahmet Oguz, suggested that secularism was composed of four elements: freedom of belief, freedom to worship, freedom to organise, and freedom to inspire and instruct.[134] He suggested that in view of "recent Turkish history and the conditions of the country" that the latter two freedoms should be under the control of the state, and he wished to see this clearly indicated in the constitution.[135]

General Cemal Gursel, the leader of the 1960 intervention, pointed out that national consciousness was not yet formed throughout Turkey.[136] He explained that if one were to go and ask an Anatolian villager who he was: "his answer would be, 'Thank God, I am a Moslem'. He does not say 'I am Turkish'".[137] He then argued that the major factor which inhibited the growth of national identity was Islam.[138] For this reason he was convinced of the need to state the secular nature of the nation in the constitution.[139]

Article 12 of the constitution declared equality before the law for all individuals regardless of "language, race, sex, political opinion, philosophical view, or

religion or religious sect".[140] This Article was approved without any major discussion.

In contrast, Article 19 provoked one of the longest discussions in the Representative Assembly.[141] This Article ran as follows:

> Every individual is entitled to follow freely the dictates of his conscience, to choose his own religious faith and to have his own opinions.
>
> Forms of worship, and religious ceremonies and rites are free provided they are not in opposition to public order, or morals or to the laws enacted to uphold them.
>
> No person shall be compelled to worship, or participate in religious ceremonies and rites, or to reveal his religious faith and beliefs. No person shall be reproached for his religious faith and belief.
>
> Religious education and teaching shall be subject to the individual's own will and volition, and in the case of minors, to their legally appointed guardians.
>
> No person shall be allowed to exploit and abuse religion or religious feelings or things considered sacred by religion in any manner whatsoever for the purpose of political or personal benefit, or for gaining power, or for even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the state on religious dogmas. Those who violate this prohibition, or those who induce others to do so shall be punishable under the pertinent laws. In the case of associations and political parties the former shall be permanently closed down by order of authorized courts and the latter by order of the Constitutional Courts.[142]

The importance given to secularism can be seen from the statement made by Fehmi Alpaslan, representative for

the Province of Atrvin, who said that it was by adopting secularism that Turkey "Found its place" in the civilized world.[143] Rauf Gokcen, representative for the National Unity Committee, remarked that he thought secularism was still misunderstood as being a rejection of religion; an interpretation he rejected.[144]

Cevdet Aydin, representative of the Province of Siirt, maintained that Turkey still did not conform to a strict definition of secularism.[145] As he pointed out, in Turkey the Presidency of Religious Affairs, "schools for training Muslim clergy...the Theological Faculty... were placed under state control".[146] Sadettin Tokbey, representative of the RPNP, insisted that in a secular state religion and the state do not interfere with one another.[147] He went on to express concern that Article 19 would enable the state to interfere with religious convictions.[148] Kadircan Kabli, representative of the RPNP, added his name to those who thought that neither religion nor state should be allowed to interfere in one another's affairs.[149] But Omer Sami Cosar, representative of the press, said that the state should be able to control religion as no other force existed to control "the superstitions and the backward situation in religious matters" in Turkey.[150] The Chairman of the Commission, Enver Ziya Karal, justified the fact that the state could intervene in religious affairs by pointing out that Islam was not only a system of beliefs, but also "an order of life, an order of society, an educational system, a political ideology and a form of state".[151] This seems to be little short of a recognition that Islam cannot be secularized; it can only be dismantled, however partially.

Additionally Rauf Gokcen, representative of the National Unity Committee, pointed out that the second paragraph of the Article could be interpreted as allowing the re-opening of the dervish lodges.[152] He thought this paragraph should be re-written in order to clearly prevent such an interpretation.[153] This insistence that it should not be possible to interpret the constitution as sanctioning the dervish orders is interesting in view of the fact that not long after these discussions were taking place some of the dervish orders were functioning more or less openly in any case. Despite all the above discussions, however, the Article was approved in the form quoted above.

Another of the general principles outlined by Enver Ziya Karal was that political parties which did not conform to secular principles should not be allowed to exist.[154] Thus, Article 57 stated that:

> The statutes, programs and activities of political parties shall conform to the principles of a democratic and secular Republic.[155]

This proved to be an area of consensus.[156] Consequently Article 57 was accepted without any lengthy debate.[157]

Finally we come to Articles 153 and 154. Article 153 proved to be another area of consensus.[158] It reads as follows:

> No provision of this constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the following reform laws which aim at raising the Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilization and at safeguarding the secular character of the Republic which were in effect on the date this constitution was adopted by popular vote:

1) The Law on the Unification of Education of March 3, 1340 (1924) no. 430.

2) The Hat Law, of November 25, 1341 (1925), no. 671.

3) The law on the closing down of dervish convents and mausoleums, and the abolition of the office of keeper of tombs, and the law on the abolition and prohibition of certain titles, of November 30, 1341 (1925).

4) The conduct of the act of marriage according to Article 110 of the Civil Code of February 17, 1925, no. 743.

5) The law concerning the adoption of international numerals of May 20, 1928, no. 1288.

6) The law concerning the adoption and application of the Turkish alphabet, of November 1, 1928, no. 1353.

7) The law on the abolition of titles and applications such as efendi, bey, pasha, of November 26, 1934, no. 2590.

8) The law concerning the prohibition of wearing certain garments, of December 3, 1934, no. 2596.[159]

These laws were considered to be those which had "initiated the beneficial reforms introduced in Turkey between 1924 and 1934".[160] This Article reflects the fact that one of the "fundamental principles" outlined by Karal as a guide to the new Constitution was that the Ataturk reforms were to be considered inviolable.[161]

The most useful feature of this Article is that it outlines those reforms which the rulers of Turkey themselves considered to be of the most importance. These individual reforms were discussed in Section Three of the present work.

Article 154 was concerned with the administration of religious matters. It reads:

> The Office of Religious Affairs, which is incorporated in the general administration, discharges the functions prescribed by a special law.[162]

This institution, variously referred to as the Department of Religious Affairs, or the Presidency of Religious Affairs, appoints and pays religious functionaries with money which comes to it out of the general budget.[163]

With this Article we have concluded our consideration of the relevant Articles of the 1961 Constitution.

Now we may look at the relation of politics and religion since 1950. No completely satisfactory picture can be given. The religious element in Turkish politics is notoriously difficult to assess. A brief outline may be provided however.

With the transition from a one-party to a multi-party system in Turkey, religion emerged as a political and social issue once again.[164] As religion was still strong among the mass of the people liberalization of controls on religion became a vote-catching slogan.[165] All parties tried to some extent to exploit the religious factor to their advantage though this does not mean that any of the major parties would be prepared to appease reactionary elements to the extent of threatening the existing order.[166] Nor should the importance of the religious factor in determining voting behaviour be over-estimated. During the 1950s economic factors remained one of the most important influences on rural voting patterns.[167]

During the 1960s Islam became of great ideological importance in the political climate as a counter-weight

to the radical, socialist ideas which were gaining ground.[168] The law governing Political Parties of 1965 explicitly outlawed the establishment of political parties in conflict with the principle of secularism[169] a prohibition which, as we have seen, was also expressed in the 1961 Constitution.

With the election of the Democrat Party in 1950 a "new phase in the retreat from extreme secularism" was opened.[170] Part of the strength of the Democrat Party lay in their promises concerning religion in the lives of the people.[171] To win support from the peasants and from the urban lower-classes during the 1950s the Democrat Party often made appeals to Islamic religious sentiments.[172] The Democrat Party newspaper Zafer stated, for example:

> The pure form of Islam as formulated by our Prophet has been the guide and the auxilliary of science, progress, virtue and good morals.[173]

The Democrat Party took a somewhat "less ardent" attitude to secularism than had the Republican Peoples Party before them, though the picture drawn by opponents of the Democrat Party which portray the party as one dedicated to religious revival is rather exaggerated.[174] However, as a result of the more relaxed attitude Islamic groups did increase their political activity.[175] Menderes, the leader of the Party, and his close associates neither wanted nor could afford a religious reaction endangering the foundations of the Republic.[176]

To illustrate this point a number of actions by the Democrat Party government against religious groups may be noted. In 1951 it began rounding up members of the

Tijani order for their iconoclastic attacks on statues of Ataturk which were noted above.[177] Throughout the 1950s the Democrat government prosecuted members of the outlawed dervish orders and of extreme religious groups whenever they became too prominent.[178] One individual who was prosecuted, in 1956, was Fevzi Bayer, a preacher (hatip), who said during one of his sermons: "all the devout should attend the Democrat Party meeting...those who do not attend may be classed as infidels".[179] Though Democrat Party leaders doubtless agreed with the sentiments expressed, a prosecution was initiated because it was felt that the preacher had gone too far. The party leadership also resisted demands from some of its own members for the abolition of secularism and a full return to Islam.[180]

In general, Menderes believed that Ataturk had gone too far too fast along the road of secularism.[181] During his early years in office, however, Menderes's policy towards religion was not marked by any extravagant concessions to Islam.[182] The re-opening to the public of tombs of the saints was officially justified on the grounds that they were buildings of architectural importance and were to be considered historical monumments.[183]

However, towards the end of the 1950s Menderes had begun to use religion as a political tool.[184] In a speech in Konya, in December 1955, Menderes stated: "we do not believe that a society without religion can become a stable nation".[185] Nineteen Democrat Party Deputies in the Grand National Assembly took such exception to this remark that they resigned from the Party.[186] The later

years of the party, up to 1960, were increasingly characterized by a dependence on the political use of Islam to offer symbolic inducements to voters as a means of propping up the electoral popularity of the party which had begun to decline.[187] In 1957 this attempt to regain popular affection caused Menderes to begin encouraging religious reactionaries.[188] However, it would be a great mistake to regard Menderes as being responsible, single-handedly, for the religious revival of the late 1950s.[189] Alderman explains that Menderes, as an astute politician: "was guilty, rather of exploiting this reaction".[190]

The Turkish armed forces strongly disapproved of the Democrat government's attitude of "ambivalence" towards secularism.[191] This influenced the decision taken by senior army officers to intervene in Turkish political life in 1960.[192] The position taken by the National Unity Committee which held power after the military intervention is summarised by Ozbudun as follows:

> Although many of the Committee members are said to be practising Muslims, and some have expressed a strong interest in encouraging an enlightened Islam, they all unequivocally condemned the exploitation of religion for political ends and the retrogression of Kemalist secularism in the multi-party period.[193]

Prior to the multi-party system the Republican Peoples' Party had enjoyed a monopoly of political power. During that time Islam was largely ignored by the government except, of course, when the government passed reforming measures discussed in the previous section to curb the influence and power of Islam in the country.[194] By thus ignoring Islam both the party and the government

became alienated from the people they ruled.[195] In response to the new situation in the multi-party period the Republican Peoples Party modified its traditional secularist position by accepting most of the changes introduced by the Democrat Party.[196] On 15th February, 1951 in the newspaper Ulus, Kasim Gulek the General Secretary of the party said: "most Turks feel honoured by being Muslims".[197] Throughout the multi-party period the Republican Peoples Party has been at great pains to stress that it is not an anti-religious party.

A more extreme example of the trend towards the politicization of Islam can be seen in the National Order Party, which was later suppressed and re-emerged as the National Salvation Party. This group, or groups, shamelessly exploited religious feelings. Because of the restrictions on using religion for political ends these parties could only argue indirectly for a government based on Islam.[198] Yet this was a basic element in their platform.[199]

The National Salvation Party was founded on October 11th, 1972 and was closed down, along with all other political parties, after the military coup of 1980.[200] The support for the party in terms of numbers of votes cast did not vary greatly between the elections of 1973 and 1977.[201] In each of these national elections it received about 1.25 million votes.[202] However this did not mean that the party was in an identical position after each election. In 1973 the votes gained by the party amounted to 11.8% of the total, giving the Party 48 seats in the Grand National Assembly.[203] On this occasion this

gave the party the balance of power as any of the other parties who wished to form a coalition government would need the support of the National Salvation Party.[204] The National Salvation Party came to power as part of a coalition government with the Republican Peoples Party after receiving a vote of confidence from the Grand National Assembly in February 1974.[205] This government only lasted, however, until 18th September 1974.[206] In the national elections of 1977 the votes cast for the National Salvation Party represented only 8,56% of the total votes cast, for which they received 24 Assembly seats.[207]

Officially the National Salvation Party was in favour of secularism, but, unofficially, it was its "die-hard enemy".[208] In the first Article of the party programme "Moral Development", that is religious revival, preceded "material development".[209] Article 18 of the programme supported secularism as long as it guaranteed freedom of thought and belief, but stated that secularism should not be allowed to become the means of oppressing those people who did think and believe.[210] In the field of foreign policy the programme advocated closer relations with the Islamic world (Art. 42).[211] With regard to education it advocated emphasising religious education (Art. 82) and developing an educational system based on "modesty, morals, and virtue" (Art. 66).[212]

In 1973 the leader of the National Salvation Party, Erbakan, declared that: "the only source of truth is in Islam".[213] The party, more generally, believed that, as Alkan concludes:

> All Turkish institutions should be reorganized according to the Qur'an, including medicine, commerce, education, the military, industry, agriculture and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.[214]

That is to say, it intended nothing less than to create "an Islamic state out of the secular Turkish republic".[215]

Before moving on, brief mention may be made of the Unity Party or Union Party. This party maintained that it was progressive and Kemalist, but it was accused by its opponents of being a sectarian party funded by the Shi'i community.[216] This party was never well supported in the national elections receiving 2.8% of the votes in 1969, 1.1% in 1973 and 0.4% in 1977.[217]

Here we must conclude our necessarily brief and incomplete sampling of various types of relations between political parties and religion to be found in Turkey. A major reason for the difficulty in assessing the religious dimension of the political parties is the inability of researchers to establish the methods used by the grass-roots politicians. It seems reasonable to expect that national politicians, knowing that they would be quoted in the press would issue relatively moderate statements. But it is known that they found other ways to indicate their religious commitment. For example, by stopping a speech to go and pray and encouraging the audience to follow, as some candidates did. I suggest that at the grass-roots politicians would be more free with their use of religion in the political competition for votes.

On September 12th, 1980 the military intervened in political life in Turkey and took control of the country.

Public order in Turkey had become so uncontrollagle that the military would certainly have intervened anyway, but the timing of the coup may have been affected by events at a fundamentalist rally in Konya.[218] The rally saw banners written in the old script being paraded before the crowds.[219] The new military regime was most critical of past tendencies for politicians to use religion in order to win votes.[220] Such criticisms of past actions have been accompanied by warnings concerning the present and the future. In 1984 it was stated that "religious fanatics are again active, but moving very cautiously and avoiding exposure".[221]

1982 Constitution:

The new constitution of 1982, prepared after the coup, explicitly outlaws radical political parties advocating a theocratic system of government.[222] Article 2, following the pattern of previous constitutions declares the state to be both secular, and loyal to the "nationalism of Ataturk".[223]

Further, in Article 4 it is stated that Article 2 shall neither be amended, nor shall its amendment be proposed.[224]

Article 10 states that all individuals are equal irrespective of "language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such consideration".[225] In addition to this, Article 14 declares that none of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the constitution shall be exercised with the intention of creating discrimination on any of the above bases.[226] When basic rights and freedoms are suspended, partially or entirely: "no one may be compelled to reveal his religion, conscience, thought or opinion, nor be accused

on account of them" (Art. 15).[227] Thus it can be seen that the constitutional provision of freedom of conscience is maintained in the 1982 version of the constitution of the Republic.

Article 24 deals specifically with religious freedom. It is broadly the same as the corresponding Article (Art. 19) in the 1961 constitution dealt with above. One change is noticeable however. For the first time in the history of the Republic the Constitution of 1982 embodies the requirement that education in "religious culture and moral education" should be a compulsory element in both primary and secondary schools (Art. 24, paragraph 4).[228]

The injunction in Article 24 regarding the unacceptability of using religion for political ends is strengthened by Article 68. This specifies that "the statutes and programmes of political parties shall not be in conflict with...the principles of the...secular Republic".[229] This corresponds to Article 57 of the 1961 Constitution. How effective this provision will be remains to be seen. From the above discussion of political parties it will be seen that the 1961 Constitution was not terribly successful at eliminating the political manipulation of religious sentiments.

The Department of Religious Affairs is dealt with in Article 136. This states that the Department is part of the general administration and that its duties are prescribed in a special law.[230] This much was stated in the Constitution of 1961 (Art. 154). However, the 1982 Constitution also states the manner in which the Department's duties shall be exercised. They are to be

carried out "in accordance with the principles of secularism, removal from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity".[231] Here, then, it is made explicit that the Department must conduct itself in a secular manner. Also it is interesting to note that it is seen as an institution aiming at the solidarity and integrity of the nation. This function is not made any more explicit. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that one way in which it is to promote national integrity is by closely observing those religious groups which may threaten the state, of any part of it.

Finally we come to Article 174. This corresponds to Article 153 of the Constitution of 1961. It provides a Constitutional guarantee for those of the Ataturk reform laws listed.[232] But it also indicates by the fact that these are to be considered unchangeable, that these reforms have come to be considered, by one section of Turkish society, to be in effect sacred things.

Thus the regime in power after September 12th, 1980, has sought in the new constitution to reaffirm the principle of secularism established by the Kemalist reforms. But at the same time, the regime has been unwilling to make too outspoken a statement on matters of secularism and religion as they are currently drawing closer to other Islamic countries for economic and foreign policy reasons.

With regard to the position of women it is lower-middle class women who are the most secluded of Turkish women.[233] They are also the least likely group of Turkish women to seek employment outside the home.[234] Yet this

represents a choice which economic circumstances within the family allows this group to make. Women in low-income families are often forced to seek employment beyond the home and will often regard such employment as they take as a "temporary, sometimes shameful, expedient" to see the family finances through hard times.[235] Women of the elite group, however, are encouraged to qualify for professional employment.[236] They are enabled to do this because of the existence of many illiterate or semi-literate women "who can be hired at low wages to take over the domestic tasks a working professional woman" has no time for.[237] Among this group of highly-educated professionals sexual differentiation in matters of employment is virtually non-existent.[238] In almost all non-professional employment, however, male and female tasks are quite distinct with the sexes usually being separated spatially.[239] Generally speaking, most women in contemporary Turkey still tend to lead less public lives than men.[240]

In most social strata girls are expected to show modesty and to practise avoidance of boys.[241] They may "flirt from a distance" with looks and gestures but to engage in direct conversation would generally not be considered proper.[242] Even the aparently Westernized childrem of elite groups tend to operate socially more as members of a tightly-knit uni-sexual group than as individuals seeking social relationships with individuals of the opposite sex.[243] Girls are very unlikely "to develop an intimate relationship with a boy who is a potential husband".[244] The most likely exception to this rule is the intimate relationship which sometimes develops between

a girl and her brother, especially if he is close to her own age.[245] Even well educated professionals, of both sexes, are most likely to move in a uni-sex social world.[246] Within the family the most intimate relationships tend to be between members of the same sex.[247] However, in almost all families, unless there are strangers present, males and females will eat together.[248] But sexual divisions of labour within the family are quite marked: to the extent that "a single man is greatly pitied because it is assumed that he will be unable to take care of his own domestic needs".[249]

With regard to the preference for a male child there is a variation which is clearly economic in nature. It has been discoveren in extensive surveys that: "where economic VOC Value Of Children assumes great importance, there is also widespread sex preference".[250] The preference is, of course, for a male child.

Having noted these various developments we may now look at one specific controversy. In 1981 a circular was issued by the Ministry of Education stating that girls of school age were forbidden to wear head-scarves while attending classes.[251] This was answered by a statement by the Department of Religious Affairs who said that it was God's will that women should keep their hair covered.[252] The Department went on to say that it was no more sensible for the state to order that people should not wear head-scarves than it would be for it to order that they must do so.[253] Encouraged by the attitude of the Department of Religious Affairs several hundred girls at an imam-hatip school in Ankara refused to attend classes.[254] Commenting

on these events in the Consultative Assembly Mr. Mehmet Pamak argued that "while the state should be secular, it should not expect religion to be so".[255] The controversy over head-scarves has continued from time to time since this affair. In 1985 it was stated that the growing number of young women wearing head-scarves was causing concern among educated circles in Turkey.[256] On being asked why she wore a head-scarf a young girl told President Evren that she wore it for religious reasons.[257] It was pointed out, however, that these wearing head-scarves went out and met boy friends as did other young Turkish women.[258] This topic has been noted at some length in order to show how secularism is still a live issue in Turkey.

Live though the issue is, the changes which have taken place since the beginning of the multi-party period should not be over-estimated. The state as such is still in Turkey basically secular.[259] It was just that political parties tried using religious affiliation and feeling as a basis for winning votes.[260]

As Kazamias stated in 1966:

> To what extent Ataturk had succeeded completely in secularizing the new nation...and the minds of the people, is today not so clear as it may have seemed during the heyday of religious reform.[261]

Indeed, the visitor to modern Turkey can be left in little doubt that it is a Muslim country. This remains true even if the law of Turkey is not based on Islamic law.

This concludes our review of recent developments. All that remains now is to make sense of these develop-

ments and to review, briefly, the question as to whether or not modern Turkey is a secular state.

CONCLUSION

In Section Two we saw that Westernization, and with it Secularization, was but one of a number of solutions offered to the decline in the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire. Yet it was this solution, compounded by Ziya Gokalp and put into action by Mustafa Kemal which won the day.

A certain amount of reform in a Westernizing and secularizing direction had been going on, as we saw in Section Three, for some time prior to the birth of the Republic. It was with the Republic, however, that the pace of the reform movement quickened and the reform measures became more daring. Some measures, like the adoption of a new Civil Code, were major reforms in their own right. Others, such as the introduction of the metric system of measurements were more symbolic. But if all the reforms are taken together, as they should be, the combined weight of the measures is considerable. Yet these reforms, it must be remembered, were imposed on the people from above and only partially filtered down to remote areas and to the lower-classes.

After the death of Ataturk the reform movement appeared to lose its vigour, leaving the situation much the same until 1950. How are we to understand what happened next? As we have seen the politicians realised that the peasants and lower classes, who had been least altered ideologically by the reforms, were still very attached to Islam. These groups also counted for a majority of the electorate. To take a less rigorously secularist attitude to religion was an obvious way to appeal to this majority. On the other hand the principle of secularism was written into the

constitution. There was thus a limit to what could be come about the religious situation.

One solution was to make small, but symbolic concessions to religious and traditionalist opinion. The restoration of the Arabic Call to Prayer is an example of this type of move. Another solution was to ignore the law without altering it. The re-emergence of the dervish orders was largely made possible by such a policy. Another solution has been simply to flout the law. The laws forbidding the exploitation of religious sentiments for political ends were systematically flouted in this way, particularly by right wing parties, until the military take-over in 1980.

Heyd, surely, was correct in describing what has happened in the multi-party phase of the Republic's history as a "retreat from extreme secularism".[1] It was not secularism itself, but only its more extreme manifestations which were abandoned. The movement was a tactical retreat: it was neither a wholesale evacuation nor a surrender of the principle of secularism. The more extreme reactionaries, whether religious groups (the Nurcus) or political parties (the National Salvation Party) failed to win majority backing. It seems that what the Turks desired, and to a large measure have achieved, was not a pendulum swing reaction to secularism, but rather a compromise between an Islamic society and a secularist polity. Turkish society remains Islamic though the political and legal systems are built upon secular foundations.

A consensus on a reasonable compromise between Islamic society and secular state is not easy to find. Since the military intervention of 1980 there has been a sometimes

lively debate as the two sides begin a fresh search for this mutually tolerable compromise. Where the final balance will be struck on this occasion it is impossible to say. The on-going controversy over the wearing of head-scarves, for example, shows that in Turkey today secularism is still very much a live issue.

NOTES

SECTION ONE

1. Budd, Sociologists And Religion, p119.
2. Ibid., p119.
3. Hewitt, "Secularization", p170.
4. B. R. Wilson, Religion In Secular Society, (1966) quoted in Budd, Sociologists And Religion, p120.
5. In D. Martin, The Religious And The Secular (1969), and A General Theory Of Secularization (1978).
6. Martin, The Religious And The Secular, p9.
7. Pickering, Durkheim's Sociology Of Religion, p446.
8. Budd, Sociologists And Religion, p120.
9. Ibid., p120.
10. Ibid., p121.
11. Ibid., p121.
12. Ibid., p121.
13. Martin, A General Theory Of Secularization, p17.
14. Ibid., p17.
15. Ibid., p5.
16. Ibid., p5.
17. Ibid., p6.
18. Ibid., p6.
19. Martin, The Religious And The Secular, p9.
20. Ibid., p15.
21. Ibid., p16.
22. Ibid., p16.
23. Ibid., p9-10.
24. Ibid., p18.
25. Ibid., p18.
26. Ibid., p18.
27. Ibid., p13.

28. Pickering, Durkheim's Sociology Of Religion, p452.

29. Ibid., p448-50.

30. Ibid., p454.

31. Ibid., p442.

32. Ibid., p444.

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